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1.1. Climate change – the scientific basis 
Since the end of the 20th century, the relation of humans to the climate has changed 
considerably. While climate was long perceived as something given, nowadays the 
perception of climate is focused on issues related to the human influence on the climate 
(Cubasch and Kasang 2000).  
The greenhouse effect was described as early as 1827 by the French scientist Fourier. He 
found that trace gases (e.g. water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide) let the 
sunlight pass freely to the Earth´s surface, but absorb and trap the sunlight which is 
reflected back towards space as infrared radiation (heat). Therefore, these trace gases are 
also called greenhouse gases. At Fourier´s time, the greenhouse effect was discussed 
mainly with view on its role for maintaining a life-sustaining environment on the earth. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, however, the Swedish scientist Arrhenius was the first to 
point out that the growing volume of carbon dioxide emissions due to the Industrial 
Revolution was changing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and was 
leading to an increase in the Earth´s surface temperature (Grubb 1999). It took until 1957 - 
the International Geophysical Year – for the international research community to address 
this question more seriously. The First World Climate Conference in 1979 was one of the 
first major international meetings on the issue of climate change (UNFCCC 2003a). A 
result of this conference was the increased support of research on the scientific basis of 
climate change which finally led to the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. The findings of the First and Second Assessment Report 
of the IPCC published in 1990 and 1996 concluded that the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere was rising due to human activities and that this would lead to rising 
temperatures and a human-induced climate change1 (Grubb 1999). The Third Assessment 
Report of the IPCC published in 2001 reinforced the conclusions of the earlier reports, 
stating that the global average surface temperature has increased over the 20th century by 
about 0.6° C, and, that there is evidence that most of the warming observed over the last 50 
years is caused by anthropogenic activities. (IPCC 2001)   
1.2. The international climate policy regime 
Against the background of the results of the First Assessment Report of the IPCC, the 
Second World Climate Conference held in 1990 called for the creation of a global treaty 
                                                 
1 A certain degree of climate change due to natural reasons has existed since the formation of the earth.  
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and initiated negotiations on a convention on climate change by establishing the 
Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC). In 1992, the INC adopted the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was subsequently 
opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
in the same year. The UNFCCC entered into force on 21 March 1994 (UNFCCC 2003a).  
Article 2 addresses the objective of the convention (UNFCCC 1992):  
 
“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with 
the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to 
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production 
is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner.” 
 
Ever since 1995, Parties have met annually at the Conferences of the Parties (COP). The 
COP is the ultimate decision-making body of the UNFCCC responsible for the 
implementation of the Convention as well as its further development. However, soon 
Parties noticed that the relatively general provisions of the UNFCCC would not be enough 
to achieve the goal of stabilizing the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere. 
Therefore, at the first conference of the Parties (COP 1) in Berlin, the negotiation of more 
detailed and binding commitments were initiated (Oberthür and Ott 1999). A framework 
sketching basic rules and including legally binding commitments for a set of industrialized 
countries and countries with economies in transition (Annex B countries2) - now known as 
the Kyoto Protocol - was adopted at COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. In the 
Kyoto Protocol, so called Annex B countries have agreed to reduce their overall greenhouse 
gas3 emissions by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period (2008-
2012). However, implementation details are not addressed by the Protocol. In 1998, COP 4 
decided the Buenos Aires Plan of Action which laid out a work program for the negotiation 
on open implementation issues. After a deadlock at COP 6 in La Hague, the Buenos Aires 
Plan of Action could be finalized in 2001 at COP 7 in Marrakech. The resulting decisions - 
also labeled the Marrakech Accords - were a milestone in the negotiations on the rules and 
                                                 
2 The terms Annex B and Annex I country are often used interchangeably. This is, however, not exact. Annex 
I refers to the UNFCCC. Parties with emission reduction targets are listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol, 
therefore labelled Annex B countries. Only two countries (Turkey and Belarus) are Annex I countries without 
being listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.  
3 The greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, nitrous oxide, 
HFCs, PFCs as well as SF6.  
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modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. With the Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, it 
entered into force on 16 February 2005.  
The three flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol – Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading are supposed to lead to an efficient 
compliance with the Kyoto commitments. The first two allow Parties with emission targets 
to conduct emission reduction or sink enhancement projects in other countries and use the 
resulting emission credits for compliance with their commitments. Emission trading creates 
an international market on which emission allowances and credits can be traded. Further 
details on these mechanisms, especially the CDM, will be dealt with in later chapters of this 
study. 
1.3. Carbon sequestration as a climate mitigation option 
Mitigation options for limiting the increase of the greenhouse gas concentration in the 
atmosphere comprise either emission reduction (avoiding emissions at the source) or 
removal and storage of greenhouse gases. Article 3.1 - in stating the goal of the Kyoto 
Protocol - uses the expression ‘reducing the overall emissions’. However, national emission 
inventories include emission reduction as well as removal of greenhouse gases through 
certain sequestration activities.  
Carbon sequestration activities have in common that they do not avoid the production of 
CO2, but lock carbon (dioxide) away from the atmosphere for a certain period of time. This 
long-term storage of carbon can take place either in the terrestrial biosphere, underground 
or in the oceans. Carbon sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere refers to activities leading 
to an increase in carbon stocks in the terrestrial biomass as for example through 
afforestation. Such carbon sequestration activities have entered the Kyoto Protocol as the 
‘Land use, Land-use change and Forestry (LULUCF)’ issue. Often LULUCF has simply 
been referred to as the ‘sinks issue’4 . As the rules and modalities for accounting for 
LULUCF significantly affected the already agreed Kyoto targets, negotiations on this issue 
were one of the most contentious issues in the climate negotiations. A sequestration option, 
which has only recently entered the climate policy arena, is the one of carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS). This refers to activities which capture carbon dioxide at large 
point sources like power plants and store it subsequently in reservoirs. 
The literature on LULUCF and CCS has so far evolved rather independently from each 
other. The literature on carbon sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere is extensive, 
                                                 
4 It has to be mentioned, though, that this term is not really exact since LULUCF comprises human-induced 
emissions as well as removals (sinks) of greenhouse gases in the land-use sector.  
  5
covering natural as well as social sciences. The economic part has mainly focused on costs 
of different options as well as policy aspects regarding the temporary nature of carbon 
sequestration in biomass. This body of literature has, to a great extent,  developed parallel 
to the discussion on the integration of LULUCF into the international climate regime. Most 
of the literature on carbon capture and storage deals with technical aspects of capturing, 
transporting and storing carbon, and costs associated with this. While the early literature on 
carbon dioxide capture and storage was mainly based on the idea of ocean sequestration, it 
is now focusing on storage of CO2 in geological reservoirs. Some recent studies address 
different aspects of seepages of CO2 from reservoirs. However, only very few studies 
examine issues related to the integration of carbon dioxide capture and storage into the 
international climate regime.  
The present study deals with some of the policy-related issues of carbon sequestration 
which so far have not been considered sufficiently in the literature.  
These issues are: 
1. The negotiation process on the integration of LULUCF into the Kyoto Protocol, 
including the respective negotiating positions of Parties to the UNFCCC as well as 
their main driving forces.   
2. Market effects of the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM, including 
consequences for the price of emission permits in the international market and the 
redistribution of benefits and losses between countries and regions.  
3. Factors determining CDM host country attractiveness, including implications for the 
geographical distribution of CDM projects. 
4. Inventorying and accounting of CCS under the Kyoto Protocol considering different 
cross-border cases and non-permanence of storage, including economic implications 
of possible releases of CO2 from storage reservoirs.  
In the following section, the structure of the thesis is described briefly. 
1.4. Structure 
Chapter 2 includes an analysis of the negotiation process on LULUCF in the context of the 
UNFCCC. Contrary to most of the studies on the negotiation process, it is not restricted to a 
qualitative analysis, but applies quantitative methods for investigating negotiating positions 
of Parties. Factors influencing the positions of countries are identified using a multinomial 
regression model. Furthermore, a zero-inflated Poisson model is applied to analyze the 
participation of countries in the submission process on LULUCF.  
  6
The economic consequences of decisions taken in the negotiations on LULUCF are 
examined in Chapter 3. Its focus lies on forestry options in the CDM. As most of the 
economic models of the international market for emission permits are neglecting carbon 
sequestration options in the climate regime, marginal sequestration cost curves reflecting 
different LULUCF policy scenarios are developed and integrated into a partial equilibrium 
model of the international market for emission permits. The results shed light on the effect 
of different policy scenarios on the market price of emission permits as well as the 
distribution of benefits and losses between countries and regions.  
While marginal cost curves, as used for the analysis in Chapter 3, are purely based on the 
potentials and costs of mitigation options, other factors are likely to influence investment 
into CDM projects as well. Therefore, Chapter 4 investigates the attractiveness of host 
countries for CDM investments taking into account that not only the mitigation potential, 
but also the institutional CDM capacity and the general investment climate are relevant 
factors. A cluster analysis is conducted to classify 114 CDM host countries regarding their 
attractiveness for CDM investments. The results can give an indication of what a future 
geographical distribution of CDM projects might look like.  
While a whole set of rules and modalities has been elaborated for integrating LULUCF into 
the climate regime, the debate on whether and how to account for CCS under the Kyoto 
Protocol is rather new. Therefore, Chapter 5 deals with the implementation of CCS into the 
international climate regime. It is one of the first studies investigating implications for 
inventorying and accounting of CCS, considering the possibility of cross-border cases and 
non-permanence of storage. Furthermore, economic implications of the non-permanence of 
storage are examined under varying assumptions on seepage and discount rates as well as 
crediting periods.  
Chapter 6 summarizes the main results of the previous chapters, concludes and highlights 
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2. The History of LULUCF – an Analysis of Negotiating 
Positions in the Climate Regime5 
2.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1, it has been mentioned that the basic structure of the climate regime was 
decided at COP 3 in Kyoto. However, international regimes are under constant 
development. Many times certain aspects which are left open to be resolved at later stages 
of negotiations, and which are considered to be of rather technical nature, later turn out to 
be major issues with great impact on the overall effectiveness of the regime (Depledge 
2001). The introduction of land use in the climate change regime – officially labeled as 
Land use, Land-use change and Forestry (LULUCF) – is such an issue.6 In using the 
example of the negotiations on LULUCF in the Kyoto Protocol, I combine qualitative 
background information with a quantitative approach to explain negotiating positions and 
behavior of Parties to the UNFCCC. As most of the studies on negotiating positions in 
international climate policy are of rather qualitative nature, the use of statistical analysis is 
rather new and can provide additional insights into the negotiation process. The results 
obtained from this study can contribute to a better understanding of the negotiation process 
in general as well as the role of sequestration in the negotiation of emission reduction 
targets. The latter might be especially relevant because negotiations on emission reduction 
targets for a second commitment period are envisaged to start in 2005.  
The first part of the paper sketches the negotiation process related to the introduction of 
LULUCF in the climate regime. In the second part, I examine possible factors influencing 
negotiating positions and the participation of Parties in the negotiation process by using 
regression analysis. 
2.2. The history of LULUCF in the climate negotiations 
2.2.1. LULUCF rules for Annex I Parties 
For analyzing the negotiation process, it is necessary to look at the roots of the discussion 
on carbon sequestration in the climate regime. The first call for a global effort on sinks 
creation by afforestation took place at the 1989 Nordwijk conference, one of the first global 
policy meetings on climate change (Nordwijk Conference 1989). At the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the goal to negotiate a forest 
convention failed. Although, terrestrial carbon sinks and sources play a considerable role as 
                                                 
5 This chapter is based on Jung (2004). 
6 In the following, sinks and LULUCF are used interchangeably, although in the strict sense LULUCF 
activities can encompass  sinks as well as sources of emissions from the land use sector.  
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an obligatory element of national emission inventories, the (non-binding) targets of the 
UNFCCC only refer to emissions. The Convention defines the term sink, but does not give 
any details on how sinks should be accounted for.  
The Berlin Mandate which was adopted in 1995 in order to strengthen the commitments of 
Annex I Parties under the Convention by the adoption of another protocol or legal 
instrument explicitly refers to ‘emissions by sources and removals by sinks’, thus taking on 
the language used in the UNFCCC.7 The Ad Hoc Group (AGBM) installed under the Berlin 
Mandate met eight times before the third Conference of the Parties (COP 3) to work 
towards the development of targets and rules for what then was going to turn into the Kyoto 
Protocol. Many of the country proposals on quantitative reduction targets – by then labeled 
QUELROs8 - brought up in the AGBM process included sources as well as removals by 
sinks. Referring to the submissions by Parties on reduction commitments, the report of the 
AGBM at its sixth meeting states that “the alternatives also reflect a range of views on the 
inclusion of removals by sinks. Some Parties prefer that sinks and sources be treated 
equally, while other Parties have proposed alternative approaches for taking sinks into 
account” (UNFCCC 1997a, p.28). Since most submissions of countries on QUELROs 
included sinks, the need for clarification on how to account for these lead to the 
establishment of an informal sinks consultation group. A questionnaire was introduced to 
clarify the main issues relating to sinks in establishing reduction commitments (UNFCCC 
1997b). It was only few months before COP 3 that negotiators became aware of how 
important the sinks issue was for the negotiation of the quantitative emission targets. A 
compilation of the country submissions on the questionnaire was available at the second 
part of ABGM 8 held in Kyoto days prior to COP 3. Most of the Parties of the Umbrella 
Group9 were the most active supporters of an introduction of LULUCF in the calculation of 
targets, while the EU and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) belonged to the most 
prominent opponents since Kyoto.10  
                                                 
7 See decision 1/CP.1 FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1,  I. (f) Coverage of all greenhouse gases, their emissions by 
sources and removals by sinks and all relevant sectors”, II. 2. The process will, inter alia: (a) Aim, as the 
priority in the process of strengthening the commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for 
developed country/other Parties included in Annex I, both - to elaborate policies and measures, as well as - to 
set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, 
for their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol. 
8 Abbreviation for quantified emission limitiation and reduction obligations 
9 This group consists of the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, Iceland, Russia, Ukraine and 
Norway. 
10  For the submitted proposals of the pre-Kyoto process, see UNFCCC (1997c to 1997f). Submissions in 
favor of sinks included those of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, New Zealand and the European Union, 
while Japan, Kenya, Marshall Islands and Nauru wanted to see sinks to be excluded in the first commitment 
  10
The chairman of the informal sinks consultation group reported to AGBM 8 a few day 
before the start of the negotiations of COP 3 that all Parties present had agreed that sinks 
were “important and should be included in commitments, subject to concerns about 
definitions, timing and scope”(UNFCCC 1997b, p.3). However, the informal consultations 
did not lead to an agreement on the sink categories to be included. Since at COP 3, the 
numbers on QUELROs could not be fixed until this decision was taken, time pressured to 
finalize the negotiations as soon as possible. In the round-the-clock consultations in Kyoto, 
Parties could agree to include afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, leading to the 
wording in Article 3.3.11 But due to the lack of scientific knowledge and data on further 
activities, it was laid down in Article 3.4 that these should be decided on by COP/MOP 1 
and apply only in the second and subsequent commitment periods. During the final 
negotiations taking place in the night session of 11 December 1997, Japan managed to add 
to Article 3.4 a sentence allowing additional human-induced activities already in the first 
commitment period if a Party decided so (Fry 2002). This sentence should have significant 
consequences for the further negotiation process by leaving great uncertainties on the 
magnitude of the already fixed targets and opening a loophole which could be used by 
Parties in the following to renegotiate their targets. Since Article 3.7 stipulates that sinks 
will not be included in the base year emissions (gross-net approach), every ton of CO2 
accounted for by additional activities under Article 3.4 would be a factual decrease of the 
reduction target for those countries having a net sink in the commitment period.12 Australia, 
however, managed to insert an exception into Article 3.7 which allows Annex I Parties with 
net emissions in 1990 from land-use change and forestry to use a net-net approach, by 
adding land use emissions to their base year emissions. The latter is a special gift to 
Australia which had considerable net emissions in the LULUCF sector in 1990. The EU 
which came to Kyoto to avoid the inclusion of LULUCF, slowly moved towards accepting 
certain LULUCF activities, partly for tactical reasons and partly due to internal opposition 
from France, Finland, Sweden and Italy (Oberthür and Ott 1999; Fry 2002).  
Therefore, the text on LULUCF (Article 3) coming out of Kyoto, taken under the severe 
time pressure and lack of data, left many issues unclear and open to interpretation. The 
                                                                                                                                                     
period. Interestingly, the position in favor of sinks expressed by the European Union and the rather sceptical 
position of Japan were the exact opposite of what both are pushing for since Kyoto. 
11 Article 3.3: “The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from 
direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and 
deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall 
be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I….” 
12 However, as described below, not all of the additional activities under Article 3.4 have been included based 
on a gross-net approach.  
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following negotiations – especially the ones on Article 3.4 - were then used by some 
countries to reopen the negotiation on the targets decided at COP 3 by reinterpreting the 
LULUCF decision. The session of the Subsidiary Bodies in June 1998 asked the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to produce a Special Report on 
LULUCF. The negotiation on LULUCF came to a hold until the report was published in 
May 2000 (IPCC 2000) because it was expected to deliver the scientific background on 
LULUCF carbon sequestration relevant for the further decision-making under the Kyoto 
Protocol. The report was perceived as quite supportive of LULUCF. Seemingly technical 
issues, as for example how to define a forest and how to differentiate between deforestation 
and harvest, were as much a source of disagreement as the decisions on which additional 
LULUCF activities to include under Article 3.4. At the SBSTA meeting in Lyon, in 
September 2000, it became clear that uncertainties regarding Article 3.4 were still 
significant. Australia and Japan pushed for narrow definitions of additional activities (e.g. 
fire control, pest control) fearing that broad definitions (forest management, cropland 
management etc.), as favored by the US and Canada, would lead to a disproportionately 
large flow of LULUCF credits into the two latter countries. The EU which had initially 
opposed any inclusion of additional activities was a weak opponent due to internal 
differences. Finally, broad definitions were adopted (Fry 2002). The developing countries 
had hardly been heard regarding this issue. However, at SBSTA 13, Brazil, speaking on 
behalf of G77 and China introduced a set of principles addressing developing country 
concerns regarding LULUCF in the Kyoto framework. The additional activities under 
Article 3.4 became the crunch issues, and were one of the main reasons for the collapse of 
the negotiations in November 2000 in The Hague. A compromise paper elaborated by the 
President of COP 6, Jan Pronk, could not break the deadlock in the negotiations (Ott 2001; 
Grubb and Yamin 2001). The resumed session in July 2001, took place under politically 
different circumstances, since President Bush had announced the withdrawal of the US 
from the Kyoto Protocol, thus giving further power to the rest of the Umbrella group whose 
ratification was now needed to let the Kyoto Protocol enter into force. At the resumed COP 
6bis (July 2001) in Bonn, countries tried to find a rule for how to account for additional 
activities. Parties were allowed to propose their own forest management caps which are 
now labeled ‘Appendix Z’. The latter includes the maximum allowable amount of forest 
management that can be accounted for by each Party. As these caps represent a proportion 
of the forest management activities undertaken anyway, and are accounted for on a gross-
net basis, they lower the factual reduction targets of Parties. Russia, not being able to 
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propose a number, introduced a paragraph allowing to revise the figure on the forest 
management cap at a later stage. The final decisions on the negotiating text were therefore 
postponed until COP 7 where Russia managed to double the provisional figure given at 
COP 6bis.13 The LULUCF text was finally adopted at COP 7 in Marrakech.14 Eligible 
activities as stipulated by the Marrakech Accords are afforestation, reforestation and 
deforestation (Article 3.3), as well as forest management, revegetation, cropland 
management and grazing land management (Article 3.4). While all forest activities are 
accounted for on a gross-net basis and accounting for forest management is limited by a 
country specific cap15, cropland and grazing land management as well as revegetation are 
included without any limits, but are based on a net-net approach. Parallel to the discussion 
on additional activities under Article 3.4, it was decided at COP 7 to include LULUCF into 
the CDM. The following paragraph will briefly summarize the process leading to this 
decision.  
2.2.2. LULUCF in the Clean Development Mechanism 
The draft text on Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12) contained a note that 
LULUCF might be included in the CDM depending on the resolution of the issue under 
Article 3 (Fry 2002; Depledge 2001). However, in the final version coming out of Kyoto, 
this footnote had been erased. Thus, the text on Article 12 only refers to emission 
reductions. It remained unclear if this wording meant that LULUCF was to be excluded 
from the CDM or not (Depledge 2001).  
A number of countries have kept this debate alive since Kyoto and demanded that 
LULUCF should be eligible. The main supporters of LULUCF in the CDM were the US, 
Canada, Japan, and the coalition of Latin-American countries GRILA.16 The European 
Union, Brazil, China and India, AOSIS and Russia belong to the countries having opposed 
the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM. The decision on the issue was passed between the 
CDM and the LULUCF contact group until COP 6bis, with no group wanting to take the 
responsibility for the subject. 
It was not only contentious whether to include LULUCF at all, but also which activities 
would be eligible in the case of such an inclusion. Some countries were aiming at an even 
                                                 
13 See also Fry (2002) 
14 See UNFCCC (2001a) and UNFCCC (2001b). 
15 Since no solution was found to factor out indirect and natural effects from directly-human induced ones, the 
cap is supposed to avoid to a great extent that residual uptake can be accounted for under forest management. 
16 The Latin-american group GRULAC has split up over the issue of sinks in the CDM. While Brazil and Peru 
wanted to see any sinks projects excluded, most of the resting Latin-American Parties formed the GRILA 
group which was actively pushing for sinks in the CDM. 
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wider inclusion of LULUCF than stipulated under Article 3. Opinions differed especially 
concerning the viability of avoided deforestation – emission avoidance through forest 
protection projects – in the CDM. The potential scale, leakage problems, socio-economic as 
well as sovereignty concerns have been brought up as arguments against its inclusion.  
The final decision at COP 7 only includes afforestation and reforestation, while avoided 
deforestation is eligible under the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol. The use of 
LULUCF credits for complying with the reduction targets was limited to 1% of base year 
emissions of each Annex I Parties per year. Nevertheless, concerns regarding non-
permanence of carbon sequestration as well as social and environmental effects were still 
prevailing. At COP 9, expiring credits which are supposed to address the concerns 
regarding the reversibility of carbon sequestration in afforestation and reforestation projects 
were adopted.17  
2.3. Country negotiating positions 
In the following, I analyze the distribution of positions of countries in the negotiation 
process on LULUCF. I focus on the three most important negotiation issues regarding 
LULUCF: the inclusion of mandatory LULUCF activities in Article 3.3 as negotiated 
mainly at COP 3, the inclusion of additional LULUCF activities in Annex I under Article 
3.4 as well as the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM – both under negotiation until COP 7. 
The negotiating positions described here represent the position Parties have voiced during 
the greatest part of negotiation on the respective issue.18 The position taken by a Party 
during the negotiations, however, does not necessarily reflect what it agreed to in the final 
decision. Since decisions in the international climate regime have to be taken by consensus, 
the text over which Parties are negotiating has to be adapted in a way that all Parties will be 
able to consent to it.19  
It has to be emphasized that decisions in the framework of the international climate regime 
are not simple yes-versus-no options. Negotiations are the development of a legal text in 
which Parties and negotiating coalitions try to introduce as much of their own position as 
                                                 
17 On temporary credits, see Dutschke et al. (2004). 
18 Voicing a position does not necessarily mean that a Party expressed this position in an official document, 
since informal meetings and conversation in the door halls are an important element of international climate 
change negotiations as well. Since we conduct a cross-sectional analysis, we cannot consider changes in 
country positions over time. This approach is justified, when assuming that the respective position is the one 
expressed during the biggest part of the negotiation process.    
19 However, no clear definition of consensus exists. The latter is necessary due to the lack of an agreement on 
a voting rule. Often it is defined negatively to mean that there are no stated or formal objections to a decision. 
A Party can reluctantly consent to a decision, but then ask for its concerns to be noted in the report after 
adoption. There is a great level of discretion of the presiding officer to decide whether the objection of a Party 
has to be formally considered or only represents some lesser level of discontent that will allow a decision to 
go forward after the adoption (Depledge 2001).  
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possible. The search for compromise consists of the change in parameters of the decision 
along different dimensions, trying to find the point that will make consensus possible. 
Graphically, this can be represented by a three-dimensional diagram as given in Figure 2-1 
which plots in a very simplified manner the positions of the Umbrella group and the EU 
versus the final outcome. In reality, even more dimensions and areas outside of the 
LULUCF negotiations will have to be considered elucidating the complexity delegates are 
facing at international climate change negotiations.20 The country positions this paper is 
referring to are the ones that a Party was pursuing in the negotiations (in our graph 
represented by the bowls ‘EU’ and ‘Umbrella’), independently of what was the final 





Figure 2-1: Country negotiating positions versus negotiation result 
 
The following paragraphs describe the negotiating positions of 166 Parties21, measured on a 
scale from ’strongly against’, ’against ’, ’neutral’, ’in favor’, and ’strongly in favor’.  
                                                 
20 The most important parameters along which negotiatiors moved in the negotiations on LULUCF are the 
number and type of eligible LULUCF activities, the degree to which the use of these different activities was 
limited by a cap, the definition of forest, the reporting and verification procedures as well as the inclusion of 
LULUCF activities in the base year of the emission inventory (gross-net versus net-net calculation). 
21 The 166 countries encompass most of the Parties to the UNFCCC at COP 3. Literature review, interviews, 
and  UNFCCC recordings were used for collecting this information.  
Gross-net 
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2.3.1. LULUCF in Annex I countries 
Figure 2-2 a) illustrates the distribution of negotiating positions of Parties regarding the 
debate held at COP 3 in Kyoto on whether to include LULUCF in the calculation of 
reduction commitments at all. The relatively big proportion of Parties taking a neutral 
stance in Kyoto can be explained by the above mentioned lack of knowledge on the subject. 
Only a small proportion of mainly Annex I countries has been pushing for the inclusion of 
LULUCF, while a significant coalition of Annex I and non-Annex I sinks opponents has 
voiced strong concerns. The group of strong opponents consisted mainly of AOSIS, India, 
Brazil, and the EU with the exception of Finland, France, Italy and Sweden, while the 
Umbrella group was actively pushing for the inclusion of LULUCF at Kyoto. 
 




































Figure 2-2: Distribution of Parties´ negotiating positions on Article 3.3 and 3.4 
 
There was considerably more time for Parties to develop a position towards the inclusion of 
additional LULUCF activities under Article 3.4 after Kyoto. Figure 2-2 b) illustrates the 
changes in the distribution of positions in the post-Kyoto phase (Article 3.4) as compared to 
the ones on Article 3.3 at COP 3. Most of the neutral non-Annex I Parties on Article 3.3 
had shifted to the group of opponents of the inclusion of additional activities, while the 
coalitions representing the supporters and strong opponents had remained unchanged. It can 
be seen that the division on LULUCF was not between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties, 
but caused by different criteria. 
b) Art. 3.4  a) Art. 3.3  
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2.3.2. LULUCF in the CDM 
The negotiating positions on the issues of whether to include LULUCF in the CDM, as 
shown in Figure 2-3, follow a different pattern than on Article 322. The coalitions of Annex 
I Parties taking a strong position in favor and against LULUCF under Article 3 did so as 
well for LULUCF in the CDM. However, a relatively big proportion of Parties remained 
undecided on the issue, while the Annex I supporters have been joined by a significant 
coalition of non-Annex I Parties in favor of including LULUCF in the CDM. While Parties 
belonging to the African group, OPEC as well as the Environmental Integrity Group voiced 
some support for the issue, the Latin-American CDM sinks supporters (GRILA) strongly 






























Figure 2-3: Distribution of Parties´ negotiating positions on LULUCF projects in the CDM 
 
The inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM is often mentioned as the issue over which there has 
been a significant split of G77 and China. This is due to the fact that Non-Annex I Parties 
can be found in both extreme positions, strongly pushing for as well as strongly being 
against the inclusion of LULUCF. This split is mainly represented by the coalition of most 
Latin-American countries highly interested in forestry in the CDM facing the rather 
skeptical coalition of China, Brazil, AOSIS and many Asian countries.  
2.4. Number of Parties versus power 
The above description of the distribution of negotiating positions, however, does not tell 
much about why certain decisions were taken the way they were. The sheer number of 
                                                 
22 In the following, Article 3 means only the two paragraphs of Article 3 analyzed here: Article 3.3 and 3.4.   
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Parties taking each position does not equal the negotiating power represented by the 
respective coalition. In reality, only a small number of Parties is actually influencing the 
outcome of the negotiations, while especially most non-Annex I Parties remain sidelined.  
The main goal of this paper is, however, to find factors explaining Parties´ negotiating 
positions by conducting a statistical analysis, and not explaining the outcome of the 
negotiations.  
2.5. Statistical analysis of country positions and participation 
in the negotiations 
After having identified the negotiating positions of countries, I use two different regression 
models for categorical independent variables to analyze issues related to the negotiating 
positions. First, a multinomial logit model is applied to identify factors affecting the 
respective positions taken in the negotiations. Second, I examine factors influencing the 
participation of Parties in the submission process in the international climate negotiations 
by using a zero-inflated count model.  
2.5.1. A multinomial logit model of negotiating positions 
When using the negotiating position as the dependent variable, the outcome categories 
of ’strongly against’ to ’strongly in favor’ represent a Likert scale which is frequently 
interpreted as a continuous scale in order to be able to conduct a standard linear regression 
analysis. Long (1997), however, remarks that such an assumption often leads to distorted 
results and that an ordered logit/probit or a multinomial logit model are more appropriate 
for dependent variables with categorical outcomes. I use the multinomial logit model to 
avoid the parallel regression assumption of the ordered logit model.23  
The multinomial logit model is used for estimating a regression model with nominal 
dependent variables. In the following, each of our country positions represents a nominal 
outcome.24 However, the dependent variable is recoded to only three outcome categories by 
                                                 
23 The outcomes of negotiating positions can be seen as an ordered scale, which makes the ordered logit 
model the first choice. For using the latter, parallel regression assumption has to be fulfilled, though, which is 
not the case in this analysis. For details on the parallel regression assumption in ordered logit models see 
Long (1997), page 140-145.  















, for m>1     
Let y be the dependent variable with J nominal outcome categories. Then )Pr( ii xmy =  is the  probability of 
observing outcome m given the ith observation of the independent variable x. The ß´s represent the 
coefficients which are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. The maximum likelihood estimator used 
for the estimation of the results based on the probability equation is:  
  18
joining the two categories ’against’ and ’strongly against’ as well as ’in favor’ and ’strongly 
in favor’. Consequently, the resulting scale used in the multinomial logit analysis consists 
of ’against’, ’neutral’ and ’in favor’.25   
The research questions guiding this analysis are based on different hypothesis which are 
supposed to be tested by the model. The first hypothesis assumes that there are certain 
domestic interests from a forestry lobby influencing the negotiating position towards 
LULUCF. Should this hypothesis hold, Parties with a bigger forestry lobby should have a 
higher probability to be in favor of including LULUCF in the climate regime. The size of 
the forestry lobby is captured by the variable export of forest products as % of GDP.  
Table 2-1: Independent variables of the multinomial logit model (explaining negotiating positions) 
hypo-
theses independent variables concept abbreviation Source 
1 Export of forest products (% of GDP) 
Importance of forest 
industry export_gdp 
Calculated based on data 
from FAO (2003) 
Distance to target with 
LULUCF (in % of 1990 
emissions) 
Stringency of Kyoto 
target with LULUCF 
in Article 3 
gap_sinks90 
Distance to target without 
LULUCF (in % of 1990 
emissions) 




Reduction in distance to 
target due to LULUCF in 
Article 3.3/3.4 (in % of 
1990 emissions) 
Decrease of Kyoto 
target due to 
introduction of 
LULUCF in Article 3 
red_targ90 
Own calculations based 
on inventory data  
contained in UNFCCC 
(2003b) and (2004), 
BAU emissions from 
Meinshausen and Hare 
(2001) 
2 
Number of Fossil of the 
Day Awards 
(COP 5-COP 9) 
Destructive 
participation in the 
climate negotiations 
awards www.fossil-of-the-day.org 
 Membership in G77+China Developing country g77  
 
The second hypothesis stipulates that the LULUCF issue was used by those Parties with a 
rather negative attitude towards international climate policy to reduce their Kyoto reduction 
targets or compliance costs through the backdoor. The part regarding the general attitude 
towards climate policy is operationalized by the independent variable ’number of the 
Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’ representing the degree of destructive participation of a Party in 




















Taking the logs of L, we obtain the log likelihood equation which can be maximized by applying iterative 
numerical methods. For further details on the MNLM see Long (1997), Long and Freese (2003), Powers and 
Xi (2000), Menard (2001) and Agresti (2002). 
25 This is done to guarantee that each category at least comprises a minimum amount of observations. The 
other reason is to avoid any doubt about the independence of outcome categories.  
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the climate negotiations. The ‘Fossil of the Day Award’ is granted at a daily basis at the 
international climate change negotiations to those countries which are considered to have 
made the worst input to or to have blocked the progress of the negotiations. The problem 
that a certain number of awards has been granted for the support of LULUCF, which would 
make our model tautological, has been accounted for by not considering those awards 
granted for issues related to LULUCF.26  
The independent variables representing the stringency of the respective Kyoto emissions 
target (distance to target) and the decrease in the Kyoto target due to the introduction of 
LULUCF under Article 3 (reduction in distance to target) are used to analyze the second 
part of the hypothesis referring to the motivation to renegotiate the target. Should this 
hypothesis hold, Parties with a high number of awards, a relatively stringent target and/or a 
relatively high decrease in the target due to the inclusion of LULUCF should be the ones 
favoring LULUCF and vice versa.  
Furthermore, the membership of G77 and China is used as a dummy variable to examine if 
the negotiating position is influenced by the membership in the negotiation group of the 
developing countries. The independent variables included in the analysis are summarized in 
Table 2-1.  
2.5.2. A count model of participation in the submission 
process 
A second part of my analysis intents to examine a third hypothesis relating to factors 
influencing the participation of Parties in the negotiations on LULUCF. The hypothesis 
states that those Parties in favor of the inclusion of LULUCF in the climate regime have 
been participating more actively in the negotiations on the issue than the other Parties. 
Although, the number of submissions is only one of many possible indicators of active 
participation in the climate negotiations, it is the only one which can be measured 
quantitatively, thus giving some impression of the behavior of countries in the negotiations 
on LULUCF.  
A fourth hypothesis stipulates that the delegation size influences the number of submissions 
a country contributed in the process. Since LULUCF is a highly technical issue, it can be 
expected that for participating in the submission process a country needs to possess the 
human resources and the technical know how on the issue. With smaller delegations, it is 
increasingly hard for delegates to follow and participate in the discussions on all the issues 
                                                 
26 The award is an initiative of the Climate Action Network (CAN). A list of the number of awards per Party 
including the reasons for the respective awards can be found at  www.fossil-of-the-day.org.  
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under negotiation.  The dependent variable is the number of submissions on LULUCF until 
COP 7. The independent variables included in the model (Table 2-2) are the average 
delegation size as well the dummy variables on the positions ’against’ and ’neutral’ on 
additional activities in Article 3.4 and the CDM, with the category ’in favor’ serving as the 
reference category. 27   
 
Table 2-2: Independent variables of zero-inflated count model (explaining number of submissions) 
hypoth-
esis independent variables concept abbreviation source 
3 
Outcome categories of country 
positions ’against ’, ’in favor’ 




art4_a (Art.3.4 against) 
art4_n (Art.3.4 neutral) 
artcdm_a (CDM against) 
artcdm_n (CDM neutral) 
See above 







The positions on Article 3.3 were not considered here, as we have learnt from the analysis 
above that only after COP 3 Parties had a well founded position on the LULUCF issue. 
Since the number of submissions is a count variable, a model for count outcomes has to be 
applied. Models for count outcomes are the Poisson regression model, the negative 
binomial regression model and the zero-inflated count models.28 The best fitting model to 
the distribution of the observed number of submissions is the zero-inflated poisson model 
which will be applied in the following. For details on the model selection, see Appendix B 
of this chapter. In the following, the results of the two models are presented.  
                                                 
27 The categorical variables representing the country positions with the outcome categories standing for each 
position taken on sinks is included here as a set of dummies. For a variable with J categories, only J-1 dummy 
variables have to be included to prevent perfect collinearity. The excluded category is the reference category.  
28 Count models are specifically designed for outcome variables indicating how many times something 







= , for y= 0, 1, 2,… ) 
putting into relation the expected number of times an event occurred (µ) with the number of times an event 
did occur (y) given a certain value of the independent variable x.  ( ) )exp( ßxxyE iiii ==µ  
While the negative binomial accounts for the failure of the Poisson model to deal with overdisperion (greater 
variance than mean), the zero-inflated (zero-inflated Poisson, ZIP and zero-inflated negative binomial, ZINB) 
count models change the mean structure to allow zeros to be generated by two separate processes, thus 
increasing the probabilities of a zero-count. They exclude those zeros from the calculation which are 
considered not to be able to get a non-zero outcome due to structural reasons, e.g. in this case, those who will 
not participate in the submission process at all, independent of delegation size and negotiating positions. The 








ii µµ−==  
For further details on count models see e.g. Long (1997) as well as Long and Freese (2001).  
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2.6. Results 
2.6.1. Factors influencing negotiating positions 
2.6.1.1. LULUCF in Article 3 
After running the multinomial logit model for negotiating positions on Article 3.3 and 
Article 3.4, a set of variables can be identified as having a significant relation to the 
respective negotiating positions.29 Tables 2-3 shows the Likelihood-ratio tests (LR test) for 
the positions on Article 3.3 and 3.4.30 In both cases, a significant influence can be identified 
for the number of ’Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’, the reduction in distance to target due to the 
introduction of LULUCF in Article 3 (gain_sinks) as well as the stringency of the Kyoto 
target (gap_nosink). For Article 3.4, additionally, being a member of G77 has a significant 
effect.  
 
Table 2-3: Likelihood-ratio test for independent variables explaining positions on LULUCF in Art. 3 
 
**** Likelihood-ratio tests for independent variables 
 
 Ho: All coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0. 
 
   a) Art.3.3|       chi2   df   P>chi2 
-------------+------------------------- 
      awards |     33.890    2    0.000 
gap_nosin~90 |     15.270    2    0.000 
  red_targ90 |      6.317    2    0.042 
--------------------------------------- 
   b) Art.3.4|       chi2   df   P>chi2 
-------------+------------------------- 
      awards |     35.707    2    0.000 
gap_nosin~90 |     12.415    2    0.002 
  red_targ90 |      6.152    2    0.046 
         g77 |     40.978    2    0.000 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Regarding our first hypothesis, no significant relation between the variables representing 
the importance of the forest sector and the negotiating position can be identified. This 
suggests that the negotiating positions of Parties on Article 3 have not been influenced by a 
forest lobby, which does not mean that there might not be other domestic influences 
belonging to other sectors of the economy.  
The significant variables are all relating to the second hypothesis. Graphical summaries 
provide the best tool for identifying basic patterns of (nonlinear) influence of these 
variables on the negotiating positions. The following graphs represent the effect of a change 
                                                 
29 For the output of the regression analysis on Article 3, see part a) and b) of Appendix A.  
30 The likelihood-ratio test which compares the likelihood-ratio statistics of the restricted model with the one 
of the full model [G2=-2 (L2r – L2f ) ] is used for obtaining sigificance levels of individual variables. In the 
following, we are refering to significant variables as those significant at the 5% level. 
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in the independent variables on the predicted probabilities of belonging to each group – 













Figure 2-4: Predicted probability of negotiating positions on Art. 3.3/3.4 with varying ’Fossil of the Day 
Awards’ 
 
The results illustrated in Figure 2-4 support our hypothesis that both for Article 3.3 and 
Article 3.4 countries holding a higher number of ’Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’ tend to belong 
to those countries being in favor of including LULUCF in Article 3. The countries which 
have never been granted any award are most probable of either having stayed neutral 
(Article 3.3 at COP3) or having fought against the inclusion of LULUCF (Article 3.4 in the 
post-Kyoto phase). Therefore, the countries pushing for the inclusion of LULUCF in the 
calculation of reduction targets seem to have been especially those countries usually 
inhibiting progress in the climate change negotiations and vice versa. 
Further support for our second hypothesis is provided by the results represented in Figure 
2-5. These indicate that Parties tended to have a supportive position towards LULUCF 
under Article 3, the more they could reduce their target due to the inclusion of sinks. This 
hardens the often heard suspicion that LULUCF was used by certain Annex I Parties as a 
tool to water down the commitments made under the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, Figure 
2-5 provides some interesting insights regarding the influence of information available on 
the respective negotiation issue. As described above, there was hardly any information on 
how certain LULUCF options would change the reduction target of different countries at 
COP 3. Graph 5 a) suggests that it were mainly the LULUCF supporters who were aware of 
their possible benefits due to the introduction of LULUCF in Article 3, while the 
probability of the sink opponents is affected less strongly by the gains. On Article 3.4, 
though, Parties had more time to gather information on the effects of each option on their 
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Figure 2-5: Predicted probability of negotiating positions on Art. 3.3/3.4 with varying reduction of 
target due to introduction of LULUCF in Article 3.3/3.4 
 
Accordingly, Figure 2-5 b) shows that, in choosing their negotiating positions, Parties 
based their decision to a significant extent on the degree by which sinks would reduce their 
Kyoto target. Consequently, especially those countries supported additional sink activities 
which became aware that they would significantly benefit from sinks. The neutral positions 
on additional sink activities seem unaffected by the reduction of the target due to LULUCF.  
However, were those Parties speculating to reduce their target by including LULUCF also 
those Parties with the most stringent reduction targets? Reducing a target which implies 
almost no real reduction above the business as usual case or even a target granting hot air is 
different from trying to reduce a target which is very strict. Figure 2-6 plots the 
probabilities of belonging to each group with varying stringency of target. For Article 3.3, 
the tendency to belong to the LULUCF opponents and the LULUCF supporters is both 
increasing with a higher stringency of the target. Interestingly, this trend is stronger for the 
LULUCF opponents. Hot air holding countries are most likely to have stayed neutral. 
Regarding additional LULUCF activities (Art. 3.4), the picture is quite different. While 
there is a clear increase in the probability to belong to the sink supporters the stricter the 
target, the probability of opposing additional sink activities is highest for countries with a 
zero distance to target, and decreasing for the countries with a positive distance to target. 
As developing countries have no reduction target (value of zero), their dominance in the 
LULUCF opponents is probably the reason for the high probability of LULUCF opponents 
at zero distance to target. The following decrease of the probability of this group indicates a 
tendency that stringency of target became a more important factor in the determination of 
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of information and knowledge on the issue can explain the differences between the two 














Figure 2-6: Predicted probability of negotiating positions on Art. 3.3/3.4 with varying stringency of 
target 
 
However, as the probability of LULUCF opponents is greater than the one of the LULUCF 
supporters at all values, the fear to be unable to comply with the Kyoto target does not seem 
to have been the main driving force for the negotiating position of countries on LULUCF 
under Article 3.  
In order to show the dynamics among negotiating positions, odds ratios can be calculated to 
illustrate, for example, how a change in expected reduction of distance to target affects the 
odds of a Party in choosing a pro-sinks relative to a neutral position.31  To analyze such 
questions, I use odds ratio plots as the one represented in Figure 2-7.32 The positive sign of, 
for example, the coefficient NIβ is expressed by a letter ’I’ standing to the right of the 
letter ’A’ representing the negotiating positions ’In favor’ and ’Neutral’. The magnitude of 
the effects is expressed by the distance between the letters, with the scales representing the 
value of snmk ,β  at bottom and the exp )( , nmkβ s at the top.33 Lines between the letters show 
insignificant coefficients. With this information, we are now able to identify patterns 
regarding negotiating positions on LULUCF under Article 3, starting with the factor 
changes in the odds of negotiating positions on Article 3.3 shown in Figure 2-7.  
                                                 
31 An odds ratio is the ratio of the probabilities of outcome m versus outcome n as xk increases by δ. The odds 












, with nmk ,β  being the the coefficient representing the effect of xk on 
the negotiating position m versus n. . For further details, see Long (1997). 
32 These can be generated by STATA and provide a relatively easy way to identify patterns which would 
otherwise be complicated to extract from a big number of coefficients.  
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 Art. 3.4
 Factor Change Scale Relative to Category neutral
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With a standard deviation increase in the number of ’Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’, the odds 
of taking a supportive position on LULUCF under Article 3.3 versus being against (or 













Figure 2-7: Factor changes in the odds of negotiating position on Article 3.3 due to change in the 
independent variables 
 
The effect of a standard deviation increase in the ‘reduction of the target due to LULUCF’ 
(red_targ90) on the odds of being in favor (versus being against) follow the same pattern as 
the one just mentioned, but the magnitude of the effect is only a very small fraction of it. 
The effects of both variables on the odds of being neutral versus against are not significant.   















Figure 2-8: Factor changes in the odds of negotiating positions on Article 3.4 due to change in the 
independent variables 
 
With increasing awards, the odds of being against versus taking a neutral position towards 
additional activities increase considerably. The effect of an increasing stringency of target 
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decreases the odds of staying neutral relative to taking a position on the issue, but only to a 
small extent. The same can be said for membership of G77 and China.  
The most interesting conclusion from the odds ratio plots is that the effect of the number 
of ’Fossil-of-the-Day Award’ on the odds of being in favor versus being neutral or against, 
are dominating in terms of its magnitude, thus suggesting that the main driving force of 
Parties to push for the inclusion of LULUCF in the calculation of reduction targets has been 
a rather negative attitude towards international climate policy. The motivation to reduce the 
reduction target also influenced the group supporting additional LULUCF activities 
positively, but to a smaller extent. The stringency of the target does not deliver a clear 
explanation for why Parties supported LULUCF, since it seem to have been also Parties 
with a relatively strict target taking an opposing position on LULUCF under Article 3. For 
Article 3.4, being a member of G77 and China increases the odds of taking a position 
versus staying neutral.  
In the following, I examine the results of the multinomial logit model for the negotiating 
positions on LULUCF in the CDM.  
2.6.1.2. Forestry in the Clean Development Mechanism 
While Annex I Parties were the ones most directly affected by the decisions on LULUCF 
under Article 3, the consequences of a decision on whether to include forestry in the CDM 
were especially relevant for developing countries. Rather than directly reducing the 
emission targets of Annex I Parties, forestry in the CDM was to influence the supply of 
emission certificates on the international market, thus influencing the price of emission 
reductions.34 The incentives for Annex I Parties to include LULUCF are, therefore, linked 
to the possible reduction in compliance costs due to cheaper prices on the international 
market. On the other hand, developing countries had to consider their benefits from CDM 
including forestry projects as compared to a purely energy based CDM. 35  The 
variable ’reduction in distance to target due to Article 3’ does only make sense for 
LULUCF regarding Article 3, and was therefore not included in the model analyzing 
positions on LULUCF in the CDM.  
                                                 
34 It is, however, rather unlikely that the introduction of forestry projects in the CDM will have a significant 
effect on the international market price. For an analysis of the effects of CDM forestry decisions on the 
international market for emission permits, see chapter 3. 
35 Therefore, it would be promising to include the variable forestry CDM potential at this point. Unfortunately, 
there is no reliable data available for the all the developing countries included in our analysis. Therefore, we 
focus only on the interest of Annex I Parties. A comparision of negotiating positions on sinks in the CDM 
with the benefits and losses encountered by Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties can be found chapter 3. 
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During the negotiations on forestry in the CDM, it was clear that LULUCF under Article 
3.3/3.4 would be included and some rough picture existed on what this would mean for the 
respective reduction targets. Therefore, the variable distance to target (gap_sinks90) used 
here accounts for this knowledge by representing the distance to target including the sinks 
options under Article 3.3 and 3.4. Table 2-4, summarizing the results of the LR tests, shows 
the significant variables which will be examined closer below. 36  Regarding the first 
hypothesis, no influence of the importance of the forest industry, measured as export of 
forest products in percent of GDP can be found, thus repeating the result obtained for 
Article 3. 
 
Table 2-4: Likelihood-ratio test for independent variables explaining positions on forestry in the CDM 
 
Ho: All coefficients associated with given variable(s) are 0. 
 
      poscdm |       chi2   df   P>chi2 
-------------+------------------------- 
 gap_sinks90 |      9.917    2    0.007 
      awards |     29.541    2    0.000 




In the following, the results regarding the second hypothesis are described by first looking 
at the variation of predicted probabilities of belonging to each group with increasing 
number of ’Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’. Figure 2-9 a) shows that - as do the results for 
Article 3.3/3.4 - mostly the countries which have a tendency to inhibit progress in the 
climate change negotiations, have the highest probability of belonging to the supporters of 













Figure 2-9: Predicted probabilities of negotiating positions regarding forestry in the CDM with 
varying ’Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’ and stringency of the target 
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The only difference to Article 3.3/3.4 is that now even countries without any awards have 
some probability of supporting LULUCF. Figure 2-9 b), representing the effects of the 
stringency of the target, shows almost identical curves for the sink supporters and 
opponents. The tendency to take a position increases the less hot air a country is holding. 
For the countries not holding hot air, an increase in the stringency of their target does not 
seem to have been a relevant factor influencing their negotiating position (relatively flat 
curve). While Parties with a lot of hot air are most probable neutral regarding LULUCF in 
the CDM, the countries with the relatively stringent targets are those taking a position 
(either against or in favor of LULUCF in the CDM). The odds-ratio plots can contribute 













Figure 2-10: Factor changes in the odds of position on forestry in the CDM due to change in the 
independent variables 
 
Figure 2-10 illustrates that an (standard deviation) increase in the number of ’Fossil-of-the-
Day Awards’, raises the odds of being in favor versus being against (neutral). However, the 
increase in the odds of being in favor relative to being against is only a fraction of the 
effects measured for Article 3.3/3.4. Now, the odds of being against versus being neutral 
increases significantly with the number of awards a country is holding, thus illustrating that 
positions on forestry in the CDM are less clearly attributable to those Parties normally 
blocking progress in the negotiations as it is for Article 3.3/3.4. With an increasing 
stringency of target, the probability of taking a position (no matter of against or in favor) 
augments slightly compared to the one of staying neutral. 
The rising support of CDM forestry projects by certain developing nations is illustrated by 
the relatively strong  increase in the odds of being in favor versus staying neutral (or against) 
caused by the membership in G77/China.  
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The following paragraph examines the third and fourth hypothesis, thus analyzing 
participation of Parties in the submission process on LULUCF.   
2.6.2. Participation in the submission process 
As mentioned above, a zero-inflated count model will be used to examine which factors 
influenced the number of submissions on LULUCF a Party provided in the negotiation 
process. Before interpreting the results of the model, I will briefly explain the two different 
groups of results which are created by the zero-inflated models. Zero-inflated models 
assume that there are two latent groups, the ’Not Always Zero’ and the ’Always-Zero’ 
group. A country belonging to the first group has a positive probability of a nonzero count, 
while the ones of the latter group will always have zero counts due to structural reasons. A 
country in the ’Always Zero group’ for submissions in the climate negotiations can be 
thought of as a country which generally does not participate in the submission process, 
independently of their position and delegation size.  
 
Table 2-5: Results of the ZIP model: factor changes in the expected counts    
 
Count Equation: Percentage Change in Expected Count for Those Not Always 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  submission |      b         z     P>|z|      %      %StdX      SDofX 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      art4_a |  -0.43103   -2.705   0.007    -35.0    -17.4     0.4427 
      art4_n |  -1.97339   -4.600   0.000    -86.1    -51.3     0.3645 
    artcdm_a |   0.36930    2.955   0.003     44.7     19.5     0.4819 
    artcdm_n |  -0.92443   -0.672   0.502    -60.3    -31.5     0.4091 
   delegates |   0.01690    4.323   0.000      1.7     19.2    10.3794 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Binary Equation: Factor Change in Odds of Always 0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Always0 |      b         z     P>|z|      %      %StdX      SDofX 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      art4_a |  -0.40951   -0.395   0.693    -33.6    -16.6     0.4427 
      art4_n | -16.37148   -0.019   0.985   -100.0    -99.7     0.3645 
    artcdm_a |  -4.13318   -3.036   0.002    -98.4    -86.4     0.4819 
    artcdm_n |  14.45751    0.017   0.986  1.9e+08  36961.7     0.4091 
   delegates |  -0.14649   -1.474   0.140    -13.6    -78.1    10.3794 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Vuong Test =  5.44 (p=0.000) favoring ZIP over PRM. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    b = raw coefficient 
    z = z-score for test of b=0 
    P>|z| = p-value for z-test 
    % = percent change in odds for unit increase in X 
    %StdX = percent change in odds for SD increase in X 
    SDofX = standard deviation of x 
 
 
The ’Not Always Zero’ group comprises those Parties which did not provide a submission 
to the LULUCF process, but generally belong to the Parties willing to provide submissions. 
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With this information, it is now possible to come to the interpretation of the results of the 
regression analysis, represented in Table 2-5.  
For those Parties being able or willing to participate in the submission process at all, taking 
an opposing and neutral position (relative to a supporting position) on additional sink 
activities under Article 3.4 (art4_a, art4_n) as well as being against forestry projects in the 
CDM (artcdm_a) relative to supporting them, has a significant influence on the number of 
submission on LULUCF a Party provided in the negotiation process until COP 7. 
Furthermore, the delegation size affects how active a country participated in the submission 
process. Being against additional LULUCF activities decreases the number of submissions 
by 35% as compared to those being in favor. For the Parties having stayed neutral, the 
number of submission even decreases by 86%. Consequently, the Parties favoring the 
inclusion of additional sink activities have also been the most active ones in the submission 
process, a result supporting the third hypothesis. For the positions on forestry in the CDM, 
the opposite seemed to have been the case. Having taken a position against forestry in the 
CDM increases the number of submissions by 45% as compared to the sink supporters. The 
latter might be due to the sink opponents trying to inhibit a broad introduction of forestry in 
the CDM on a technical level.  
Among the Parties generally being able to participate in the submission process, for every 
additional delegate, the number of submissions of a Party increases by 1.7%. Therefore, the 
hypothesis relating to the influence of delegation size on the number of submissions is 
supported. However, the delegation size seems to play a rather small role for the 
participation of Parties in the submission process on LULUCF. The latter finding shows 
that if a Party feels that an issue is important, it is able to contribute to the negotiations even 
if its delegation size is relatively small.37 
Among those generally not submitting text proposals to the UNFCCC process (Always 
Zero group), the only significant influence is exerted by the variable being ’against’ (as 
compared to being ’in favor’) of forestry in the CDM. Consequently, opposing forestry in 
the CDM decreases the odds of belonging to the group normally not participating in the 
submission process by 98% relative to the LULUCF supporters.  
2.7. Summary and conclusion 
The negotiation on LULUCF in the Kyoto Protocol has been one of the most complicated 
and contentious issues in the history of climate change negotiations. Since most Parties 
                                                 
37 Small countries join to negotiation coalitions like the one of AOSIS to take advantage of economies of scale. 
Some submissions in our data set are not individual submissions by one country, but proposals elaborated by a 
whole negotiation group.  
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were lacking knowledge on the issue when coming to COP 3 in Kyoto, a basis on which to 
take decisions regarding LULUCF was missing. Most of the Parties which had taken a 
strong position at Kyoto in 1997 remained with it in the negotiation on additional LULUCF 
activities afterwards, while the majority of developing countries, mostly unaware about the 
issue when coming to Kyoto, had moved to the group opposing additional sink activities 
afterwards. Regarding LULUCF in the CDM, however, the Annex I sink supporters were 
joined by a relatively big coalition of developing countries interested in attracting CDM 
forestry projects.    
A multinomial logit regression is conducted to test two hypothesis regarding factors 
influencing Parties´ negotiation position on LULUCF. The results do not support that the 
importance of the forestry sector of a country has a significant influence on the 
countries´negotiating position on LULUCF. They, however, suggest that the LULUCF 
issue was used by those Parties with a rather negative attitude towards international climate 
policy to reduce their Kyoto reduction targets. The countries holding a higher number of 
‘Fossil-of-the-Day Awards’, which is supposed to represent the general attitude towards 
international climate policy, have a strongly increasing probability to have supported the 
inclusion of LULUCF in the climate regime. In choosing their negotiating position 
regarding LULUCF under Article 3.3/3.4, Annex I Parties seem to have been motivated as 
well by the amount they were able to reduce their reduction target due to LULUCF. While 
the probability of belonging to the LULUCF supporters is increasing with the stringency of 
the target, rather those countries with stricter targets have the highest probability of 
opposing LULUCF under Article 3.3/3.4. The general attitude towards climate policy 
seems to have been a major driving force for the Parties pushing for LULUCF, while the 
rationale to reduce the reduction target played an important, but smaller role in determining 
the pro-sink positions.  
Regarding the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM, the stringency of the target does 
not explain whether a country belonged to the sink supporters or opponents. Furthermore, it 
is less clearly attributable to the number of the Fossil-of-the-day Awards (general attitude 
towards international climate policy), if a country has taken a favoring or opposing position 
on this issue. An important variable able to contribute more to the explanation of the main 
reasons for positions on LULUCF in the CDM might be the benefits or losses encountered 
by Parties due to the introduction of forestry in the CDM. Since no data on CDM potentials 
is available for all the Parties included in our analysis, it is out of the scope of this analysis 
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to answer how much this factor contributed to the choice of negotiating position on the 
issue.  
A second part of the paper analyzes two hypotheses relating to the participation of Parties 
in the submission process by applying a zero-inflated poisson model. For those Parties 
having taken a pro-sink position on Article 3.4, results suggest that LULUCF supporters 
have been more actively participating in the submission process, while the exact opposite 
seems to be the case for the Parties being ’in favor’ of forestry projects in the CDM. The 
countries opposing LULUCF in the CDM maybe tried to inhibit a broad inclusion of 
LULUCF by influencing the negotiation outcome on a technical level.   
The last hypothesis stipulating that Parties with bigger delegations tend to provide a higher 
number of submissions is supported by the results of the zero-inflated poisson model, 
although the influence of the delegation size on the number of submissions is found to be 
rather modest.  
Although all the Parties have one vote in the climate change negotiations, in reality 
negotiation power is distributed quite unequally. Since the LULUCF issue touches the basic 
structure of the climate change regime, namely the size of reduction commitments (Article 
3.3/3.4) and the compliance costs (CDM), our analysis of LULUCF positions can give a 
more or less representative picture of the constellation of countries in the climate regime.  
If the negotiations on targets for a second commitment period start in 2005 as foreseen, 
then Parties should have learned their lessons from the negotiation on LULUCF. These 
lessons include the knowledge that agreeing on targets before the detailed rules are fixed 
will lead to a renegotiation of targets on the basis of bending the rules at later stages. 
Furthermore, all Parties should be well prepared on important issues to avoid having to take 
decisions without sufficient information, as happened at COP 3 in Kyoto. This way they 
will be able to negotiate on more equal grounds. If some Parties are given a first mover 
advantage, the others will not be able to react until they can gather some knowledge on the 
issue by themselves.  
LULUCF has been said to have functioned as the valve of the climate regime which has 
kept certain countries on board. We have learnt that such valves are an integral part of the 









Appendix A: Outputs of the multinomial logistic regression  
 
a) LULUCF in Article 3.3 
 
Table 2-6: Output of multinomial logit model (Article 3.3) 
 
. mlogit  pos33 awards gap_nosinks90 red_targ90 
 
 
Multinomial regression                            Number of obs   =        163 
                                                  LR chi2(6)      =      78.22 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -110.92369                       Pseudo R2       =     0.2607 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       pos33 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
      awards |   .0283202   .1187384     0.24   0.811    -.2044028    .2610432 
gap_nosin~90 |   .1639362   .0619176     2.65   0.008       .04258    .2852925 
  red_targ90 |  -.0081189   .0776731    -0.10   0.917    -.1603553    .1441175 
       _cons |  -.6871775   .1962893    -3.50   0.000    -1.071897   -.3024574 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
4            | 
      awards |   .4961655   .1255553     3.95   0.000     .2500816    .7422493 
gap_nosin~90 |    .164317    .071724     2.29   0.022     .0237406    .3048934 
  red_targ90 |   .1338851   .0626489     2.14   0.033     .0110955    .2566747 
       _cons |  -3.549302     .60566    -5.86   0.000    -4.736373    -2.36223 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




        b) LULUCF in Article 3.4 
Table 2-7: Output of multinomial logit model (Article 3.4) 
 
mlogit  pos34 awards gap_nosinks90 red_targ90 g77 
 
 
Multinomial regression                            Number of obs   =        163 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =     131.65 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -55.867158                       Pseudo R2       =     0.5409 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       pos34 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
      awards |  -.3366333   .2430762    -1.38   0.166    -.8130539    .1397873 
gap_nosin~90 |  -.1432592   .0588103    -2.44   0.015    -.2585253    -.027993 
  red_targ90 |   .0427275   .0892802     0.48   0.632    -.1322584    .2177135 
         g77 |  -3.958256   .7410227    -5.34   0.000    -5.410634   -2.505878 
       _cons |   .4297046   .4546601     0.95   0.345    -.4614129    1.320822 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
4            | 
      awards |   .4449329   .1324501     3.36   0.001     .1853354    .7045304 
gap_nosin~90 |   .0527742   .0664767     0.79   0.427    -.0775178    .1830661 
  red_targ90 |   .2057448   .1113612     1.85   0.065    -.0125192    .4240088 
         g77 |   .3668091   1.335044     0.27   0.784    -2.249829    2.983447 
       _cons |  -4.097869   1.408055    -2.91   0.004    -6.857605   -1.338132 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 








     c) LULUCF in the CDM 
 
Table 2-8: Output of multinomial logit model (CDM) 
 
. mlogit poscdm  gap_sinks90  exportgdp  awards g77 
 
 
Multinomial logistic regression                   Number of obs   =        163 
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =      59.78 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -141.94922                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1740 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      poscdm |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
 gap_sinks90 |   .0086463   .0349504     0.25   0.805    -.0598552    .0771477 
   exportgdp |   8.835747   14.89796     0.59   0.553    -20.36372    38.03521 
      awards |  -.0731881   .0351681    -2.08   0.037    -.1421163   -.0042599 
         g77 |  -2.010569   .5706114    -3.52   0.000    -3.128946   -.8921911 
       _cons |   1.588483   .5505463     2.89   0.004     .5094317    2.667534 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
 gap_sinks90 |  -.0912166   .0436172    -2.09   0.037    -.1767048   -.0057284 
   exportgdp |  -69.95262   52.05733    -1.34   0.179    -171.9831    32.07787 
      awards |  -.5459367   .2453758    -2.22   0.026    -1.026864   -.0650089 
         g77 |  -2.684624   .6666854    -4.03   0.000    -3.991304   -1.377945 
       _cons |   1.655121   .6226762     2.66   0.008     .4346982    2.875544 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 






Appendix B:  Selection of count model  
 
In searching for the model best fitting the observed distribution of counts of the dependent 
variable (number of submissions on LULUCF), following results were obtained:  
 
1. The negative binomial (NBRM) is improving the fit as compared to the Poisson 
regression (PRM):  
 
a) due to significant likelihood ratio test of alpha 
 
Table 2-9: Test of alpha 
 
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =        166 
                                                  LR chi2(5)      =     124.24 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -268.14357                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1881 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  submission |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      art4_a |   -.619316   .2665798    -2.32   0.020    -1.141803   -.0968292 
      art4_n |  -1.329155   .4806714    -2.77   0.006    -2.271254   -.3870569 
    artcdm_a |   1.331145   .1732532     7.68   0.000     .9915746    1.670715 
    artcdm_n |  -2.089603   .6238856    -3.35   0.001    -3.312396   -.8668094 
   delegates |   .0329865   .0074908     4.40   0.000     .0183048    .0476683 
       _cons |    .465179   .2763312     1.68   0.092    -.0764202    1.006778 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    /lnalpha |  -1.012437     .34038                     -1.679569   -.3453042 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       alpha |   .3633326   .1236711                      .1864543    .7080049 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2(01) =   27.56 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
 
 
2. The zero-inflated poisson (ZIP) model is improving the fit over the PRM and the 
NBRM (improves prediction of zeros and values below 3) 
 
a) Vuong test of non-nested models tests if ZIP model reduced to the PRM (H0 = ψi = 
0), with ψi = Probability of being in the Always-zero group 
  
Table 2-10: Vuong test 
 
Zero-inflated poisson regression                  Number of obs   =        166 
                                                  Nonzero obs     =         84 
                                                  Zero obs        =         82 
Inflation model = logit                           LR chi2(5)      =      86.84 
Log likelihood  = -227.3408                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  submission |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
submission   | 
      art4_a |  -.4310257   .1593487    -2.70   0.007    -.7433435   -.1187079 
      art4_n |  -1.973386   .4290423    -4.60   0.000    -2.814294   -1.132479 
    artcdm_a |   .3693047   .1249779     2.95   0.003     .1243526    .6142569 
    artcdm_n |  -.9244265   1.375518    -0.67   0.502    -3.620392    1.771539 
   delegates |   .0169008   .0039091     4.32   0.000     .0092391    .0245624 
       _cons |   1.458952   .1826816     7.99   0.000     1.100903    1.817002 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate      | 
      art4_a |  -.4095072   1.036309    -0.40   0.693    -2.440636    1.621622 
      art4_n |  -16.37148   847.3344    -0.02   0.985    -1677.116    1644.373 
    artcdm_a |  -4.133179   1.361336    -3.04   0.002    -6.801349    -1.46501 
    artcdm_n |   14.45751   847.3263     0.02   0.986    -1646.272    1675.187 
   delegates |  -.1464866   .0993528    -1.47   0.140    -.3412144    .0482413 
       _cons |   1.850835    1.34625     1.37   0.169    -.7877661    4.489436 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





b. The improved fit can be easily shown by plotting the predicted versus the      























Figure 2-11: Fit of predicted counts of NBRM and ZIP to observed data 
 
3. The zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) is not improving the fit as compared to 
the ZIP model.  
 
(The likelihood ratio test of α tests whether ZINB reduces to the nested ZIP (or NBRM 
reduces to the nested PRM) by testing the H0: α = 0 (no overdispersion), with α = parameter 
reflecting unobserved heterogeneity among observations.  
 
Likelihood-ratio test comparing ZIP to ZINB:    0.000Prob>=0.449 
  
Consequently, the ZIP model is the best model, and is thus, used for our analysis regarding 
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3. Market Effects of Including Forestry in the Clean 
Development Mechanism38 
3.1. Introduction 
The negotiation process on LULUCF has been dealt with in detail in Chapter 2. In the 
following, I am analyzing the market effects of the decisions taken in these negotiations, 
focusing only on the decisions on LULUCF in the CDM. 
After it was clear that LULUCF projects could earn credits under the Clean Development 
Mechanism as well, it had to be decided which forestry activities would be eligible. A 
controversial debate evolved around the question whether to include avoided deforestation 
under the CDM. In the negotiating process, some were emphasizing the multiple benefits of 
avoiding deforestation in the first place instead of having to incur time and effort for 
afforestation or reforestation, while others brought up the argument that the inclusion of 
avoided deforestation would lead to a flooding of the permit market and thus the crowding 
out of emission reduction projects in the energy sector. The final decision laid down in the 
Marrakech Accords limits LULUCF activities in the CDM to afforestation and reforestation 
(A/R) only.  
To account for the concerns that the use of credits generated through A/R would undermine 
the main goal of the Kyoto Protocol, namely emission reductions at the source, a demand-
side cap was introduced. This cap limits the use of greenhouse gas removals from such 
projects to 1% of a Party´s baseline year emissions for each year of the commitment period. 
The rules and procedures for the implementation of forestry projects in the CDM were 
among the last implementation issues of the Kyoto Protocol and were finalized at COP 9 in 
December 2003.39  The decisions taken concerning LULUCF affect the options available to 
Parties in fulfilling their emission targets and, therefore, influence their compliance costs.  
Most of the economic models of the international market for emission offsets are only 
based on the marginal abatement cost curves of the energy sector and do not consider the 
sink enhancement options included in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Some studies 
account for LULUCF activities in a very simple manner by modifying the marginal energy 
cost curve through the inclusion of a horizontal segment with a constant marginal cost for 
the amount of carbon sequestration assumed to be available.40 Others assume LULUCF 
options to be at zero cost and represent the LULUCF potential by shifting the energy cost 
                                                 
38 This chapter is based on Jung (2005b) 
39 Rules and modalities under negotiation had to address definitions for forest, afforestation and reforestation, 
the stringency of project baselines, leakage, impermanence as well as socio-economic and environmental 
impacts. Some questions regarding small-scale projects were only finalized at COP 10. 
40 See for example Missfeldt and Haites (2001); Jotzo and Michaelowa (2002). 
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curve to the right by the sequestration potential.41 Almost all of the models including sinks 
do not specify at all which LULUCF activities they considered for the calculation of the 
sequestration potentials and costs or only focus on one forestry activity, e.g. afforestation. 
This leads to an unsatisfactory representation of the reductions potentials and costs which 
countries encounter in the climate regime. Furthermore, it neglects the influence of policy 
decisions on sinks potentials and costs and, therefore, on the carbon sequestration cost 
curves.   
Many of the arguments in favor of LULUCF have been based on the assumption that 
carbon sequestration activities are relatively cheap as compared to emissions reductions in 
the energy sector and that this is especially true for activities in developing countries. By 
conducting a literature review, I try to shed some light on what is really known about the 
costs of carbon sequestration. On the basis of the main conclusions from this literature 
review, I analyze the role of forestry in the CDM 42  by developing marginal carbon 
sequestration cost curves43 which are then implemented into a partial equilibrium model of 
the carbon market called CERT.44 I do not only include sinks as a fixed-amount-fixed-cost 
option, but put emphasis on the hitherto neglected fact that potentials and costs of forestry 
projects depend on the policy decisions taken on LULUCF in the Kyoto framework. 
Therefore, I differentiate four different forestry project types to simulate the consequences 
of different policy decisions concerning project eligibility. This differentiation allows me to 
examine some of the arguments broad up for and against the inclusion of forestry in the 
CDM in general as well as the inclusion of different project types. Last but not least, I 
describe the redistribution of benefits and losses between countries due to an introduction 
of forestry in the CDM, and try to analyze if such benefits and losses can explain country 
positions concerning forestry in the CDM in the negotiation process under the framework 
of the UNFCCC. 
                                                 
41 See for example Kappel et al. (2002); Löschel and Zhang (2002). 
42 LULUCF activities in Annex B countries will, of course, also have an effect on the demand and supply of 
emissions certificates. Here we are only focusing on LULUCF in the CDM. For an analysis of different 
scenarios of eligible LULUCF categories under Art. 3.3 and Art. 3.4 see Missfeldt and Haites (2001).  
43 The term carbon sequestration cost curve is misleading when referring to conservation of forest or 
avoiding/slowing deforestation, since these lead to emission reductions. However, for reasons of simplicity, it 
will be used here for all marginal cost curves of forestry projects. 
44 CERT 1.3.1 is a publicly available spreadsheet model from Grütter Consulting, financed by the World Bank 
for the use in National Strategy Studies. The model can be downloaded at: www.ghgmarket.info. 
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3.2. Carbon sequestration costs in the literature 
The research on carbon sequestration is relatively young.45 Starting in the late 80s, mainly 
US-American researchers began studying potentials and costs of afforestation activities to 
sequester carbon. Several studies on the cost-effectiveness and the potentials of carbon 
sequestration have been conducted.46  
 
Table 3-1: Estimates of forestry carbon sequestration potentials and costs 




Costs Marginal cost  curve 
Global/Non-Annex B 
Benìtez (2003) South America Plantations x x x 
Dixon et al.  (1991) Boreal, temperate, tropical 
Natural regeneration, afforestation, 
reforestation, agroforestry, forest 
management 
x x x 
Dixon et al. (1994) 
South America, 
Africa, South Asia, 
North America 
Agroforestry x   
Fearnside (1995) Brazil Reduced deforestation, plantations, sustainable timber management  x x  
Fearnside (2001) Brazil Silvicultural plantations, forest management, avoided deforestation x   
Houghton et al. (1993, 2001)  Latin America, Africa, Asia 
Plantations, Agroforestry, Forest 
Management x   
IPCC (2000)  Global Plantations, regeneration, agroforestry, protection, forest management x x x 
Ismail (1995) Malaysia Forest protection, plantations, forest management x x  
de Jong et al. (2000) Mexico Forest Management, agroforestry x x x 
Kerr et al. (2001) Costa Rica Forest management x x  
Makundi and Okiting'ati (1995) Tanzania Conservation, agroforestry  x x  
Masera et al. (1995) Mexico Conservation/protection, forest management, plantations, agroforestry x x  
Niles et al. (2002) 48 developing countries Forest restoration, avoided deforestation x   
Nordhaus (1991) Global Plantations x x  
Ravindranath et al. (2001) India Forest protection, plantations, regeneration x x  
Ravindranath and Somashekhar 
(1995) India 
Natural regeneration, agroforestry, 
community forestry x x  
Sedjo (1999) Argentina Plantations x x  
Sedjo and Solomon (1989) Global Plantations  x x 
Sedjo et al. (2001) Global 50 different timber and forest management types x x x 
Trexler and Haugen (1995) Tropics Slowed Deforestation, regeneration, agroforestry, plantations x   
Wangwacharakul and 
Bowonwiwat (1995) Thailand Forest protection, plantations, agroforestry x x x 
Winjum and Schroeder (1997) Global Plantations x   
Xu (1995) China Plantations, agroforestry, forest management x x x 
Xu et al. (2001) China Forest protection, plantations, regeneration, agroforestry x x  
Annex B 
Adams et al. (1993)  USA Plantations x x x 
Adams et al (1999) USA Plantations x x x 
Alig et al. (1997) USA Plantations x x  
Barson and Gifford (1990) Australia Plantations x   
Callaway and McCarl (1996) USA Plantations x x x 
Cannel (2003) Europe, UK Art. 3.3/Art.3.4 activities and biomass x   
Dudek and LeBlanc(1990) USA Plantations x x  
                                                 
45 Here, I am only analyzing carbon sequestration options due to forestry activities. Other options, like carbon 
sequestration in agricultural lands, are not considered in this chapter, since they are not part of the CDM.  
46 For a detailed analysis of past studies see Richards and Stokes (2004) 
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Golub (2000) Russia Forest management, plantations and regeneration x x x 
Gurney and Neff (2000) Canada, Russia, USA Art. 3.4 activities x x  
van Kooten et al. (1992) Canada Forest management, plantations x x x 
van Kooten et al. (2000) British Columbia, Alberta (Canada) Plantations x x  
Lewis et al. (1996) USA Plantations x x  
Moulton and Richards (1990) USA Forest management, plantations x x x 
Newell and Stavins (2000) Delta States Plantations x x x 
New York State (1991)  New York State Forest management, plantations x x  
Parks and Hardie (1995) USA Plantations x x x 
Petroula (2002) Europe Art. 3.3/3.4 activities x   




Plantations x x x 




Plantations x x  
Richards (1993) USA Plantations x x x 
Richards (1997) USA Plantations x x  
Slangen and van Kooten (1996) Netherlands Plantations x x  
Sohngen et al.  (1998) North America, Europe, subtropical Plantations x   
Stavins (1999) USA Plantations x x x 
Based on Richards and Stokes (2004), expanded and modified by the author  
 
Bottom-up approaches focus on individual processes of abatement technologies or 
sequestration options. 47  Different methods for constructing bottom-up marginal carbon 
sequestration cost curves can be used. The simplest and mostly used method is to order the 
cumulative sequestration potentials of different LULUCF activities from the lowest to the 
highest cost option. Other methods apply sector or sub-sector models, e.g. timber market 
models, cost-benefit approaches and econometric techniques.  
Table 3-1 gives a broad overview of the existing studies on LULUCF costs and potentials 
and the respective marginal cost curves developed. Most of the studies concentrate on the 
US, single US states or US regions. Some global studies exist, mainly looking at the carbon 
sequestration potentials and costs differentiated by continents or climatic zones. Studies 
which focus on the potentials and costs of forestry carbon sequestration in developing 
countries, especially the tropics, started only in the mid-nineties. The estimates of potentials 
of comparable geographic zones vary widely between studies. The same applies to the cost 
estimates. The latter could be due to the fact that many cost studies neglect a substantial 
part of costs (e.g. land costs, monitoring costs) as well as the benefits48 generated by the 
projects (Kauppi et al. 2001). This, of course, will change the cost estimates dramatically 
and result in a distorted structure of estimates when comparing different project types. For 
example, fast growing plantations may have higher implementation costs than avoided 
deforestation projects, but they also generate marketable benefits which can make them 
                                                 
47 Of course, there is also the option of constructing marginal sequestration cost curves by a top-town 
approach. In our study we are just looking at bottom-up cost curves since the development of  top down costs 
curves for LULUCF is still in its infancy. 
48 Here I am referring only to the direct, marketable benefits.  
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even profitable. Other factors influencing the carbon sequestration cost can be the discount 
rate used for the costs as well as the carbon benefits, the carbon accounting method applied, 
the model used to estimate the opportunity cost of land, the baseline assumed, the physical 
characteristic of the project area, the biomass pools included, and the silvicultural species 
used.49 Due to the above mentioned differences, the result is a whole variety of types of 
cost curves which are not directly comparable to each other (Kauppi et al. 2001; Richards 
and Stokes 2004). This makes it impossible to take marginal sequestration cost curves for 
the implementation into a global carbon market model from the existing literature. 
Therefore, in this study, I rely on a simple method to estimate consistent marginal carbon 
sequestration cost curves which can be implemented into a global carbon market model.   
3.3. Development of marginal carbon sequestration cost 
curves 
To analyze in detail possible policy scenarios concerning forestry in the CDM, it is 
necessary to define which activities I consider to be eligible LULUCF activities. The four 
categories of sink enhancement project types included in the study are plantations, 
regeneration, agroforestry and avoided deforestation. The first three are ’direct human-
induced conversion of non-forest to forested land’, thus falling under the definitions of A/R 
under the Kyoto Protocol.50 The term ’regeneration ’ as used here, refers to reforestation of 
degraded lands to secondary forests, while the category ’plantations’ covers fast-growing 
commercial plantations. Under the category ’agroforestry’, I subsume all projects of natural 
resource management integrating trees in farmland and rangeland. Projects falling under the 
category ’avoided deforestation’ result in the conservation of forest which otherwise would 
have been deforested. 
Necessary data for the development of the cost curves is data on land availability potentials 
for each project type in hectares (ha) per year, carbon uptake factors in t CO2/ha and year 
and costs for possible forestry activities in US$/tCO2.51 By multiplying the land availability 
and carbon uptake factors, one receives the carbon sequestration and storage potential for 
each project type and country.52 However, the use of the word ’potential ’ in the literature 
                                                 
49 For some approaches to identify factors influencing the cost of carbon sequestration see Newell and Stavins 
(2000), van Kooten et al. (2004) as well as Richard and Stokes (2004).  
50 For the definitions of forest, afforestation and reforestation, see UNFCCC (2001a) and Decision 19/CP.9 in 
UNFCCC (2003c). 
51 Although we are often using the term carbon, the measurement unit used in the international permit market 
is carbon dioxide (CO2). This makes sense, because in the frame of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), CO2 was chosen as the reference gas to for the Global Warming Potentials. However, many 
studies and models and especially the literature in the US employ carbon (C) as the main measurement unit.  
52 For obtaining potentials for the first commitment period, the annual values are multiplied by five.  
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on carbon sequestration is often unclear and misleading. Cannel (2003) distinguishes 
between three different interpretations of the term potential, first the ’theoretical potential 
capacity’ (physical potential without consideration of practical, e.g. institutional or financial 
constraints), second the ’realistic potential capacity’ (physical potential with consideration 
of most constraints, but optimistic assumptions) and finally the ’conservative, achievable 
capacity’ (cautious prognosis, based on current trends, with few optimistic assumptions).  
I base the land availability potentials on the data from Trexler and Haugen (1995), who 
considered qualitative constraints 53  for 52 tropical countries 54  when estimating land 
availability potentials for the above four project types. For the land availability potentials, I 
further assume that the implementation of LULUCF projects in the CDM will not start 
before 2005. Although CDM projects in the first commitment period may accumulate 
credits starting from 2000, basic implementation issues have not be solved until the end of 
2003, which makes the implementation of projects before the year 2005 unlikely. In spite of 
these additional restrictions, the Trexler and Haugen data might be optimistic in the sense 
that the estimates of regrowth project potentials do not exclude land having been deforested 
after December 1989.55 This land is not eligible for LULUCF projects because policy 
makers wanted to prevent deforestation aiming at clearing land for afforestation projects. 
According to Cannel´s categorization, I consider my land availability estimates to represent 
a conservative, achievable potential capacity, since it takes into account the most important 
constraints and few optimistic assumptions.  
Carbon uptake factors are estimated on the basis of the IPCC Special Report on Land use, 
Land-use change and Forestry (Cerri et al. 2001) weighted by the percentage of the forest 
area type in each region from the Global Forest Resources Assessment 2000 (FAO 2001). 
In the present study, the amount of carbon from LULUCF projects on the market does not 
represent the real carbon uptake, but the one accounted for the generation of carbon credits 
under the Kyoto Protocol. For plantations the carbon uptake factors vary between 5.5 and 
22 tCO2/ha and year; for agroforestry between 1.8 and 4.2 tCO2/ha; and for regeneration 
between 1.8 and 14.7 tCO2/ha without considering belowground biomass and carbon 
                                                 
53 Variables considered are: existing land use and projected land-use change, population growth rates and 
urbanisation trends, institutional and economic sources of deforestation, governmental and non-governmental 
forestry experience and infrastructures, current forestry-concessions, agricultural and energy policies, land-
tenure systems and land-titling requirements, political and economic structures and stability, infrastructural 
development plans and potential environmental, economic or social crisis facing the country. 
54 These 52 countries, plus China and Chile, which we included additionally, cover the most important 
countries for forestry projects under the CDM. Estimates for China are taken from Xu et al. (2001). For a 
country list see Appendix B. 
55 Reforestation as defined under the Kyoto Protocol in FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1“will be limited to 
reforestation occurring on those lands that did not contain forest on 31 December 1989.” 
  44
storage in wood products.56 The carbon emissions saved through avoided deforestation 
were calculated on the basis of data from Trexler and Haugen (1995) and the FRA 2000 
(FAO 2001) on the standing biomass per hectare, assuming an immediate loss of 80% of 
the carbon stored in the biomass to the atmosphere. Additionally, 10% of carbon was 
subtracted from the biomass estimates. This is supposed to account for revegetation 
occurring in the baseline after forest clearing, which reduces the amount of carbon credits 
that can be generated by the project.  
Table 3-2: Estimates of global potential for carbon uptake/storage in t CO2 per year 
Project types considered Low uptake/storage 
High 
uptake/storage 
Plantations  3,936,000  6,316,700  
Plantations and Regeneration 6,953,500 13,386,200 
Plantations, Regeneration and Agroforestry 7,324,853 14,240,311 
Only avoided  deforestation 93,215,250 159,367,750 
All LULUCF 100,540,103 173,608,061 
 
On the basis of the described land availability estimates and carbon uptake and storage 
factors, I calculate the potential carbon sequestration and storage for the different project 
types as summarized in Table 3-2.  
The potentials for each country are listed in Appendix A. Due to the given uncertainties, I 
consider two different sets of carbon uptake factors, one with low and one with high 
estimates. 
Although, the literature is unclear about the level of carbon sequestration costs, it provides 
a rough picture on the order of costs of different project types. For my study, I therefore 
assume a certain order of net cost estimates with avoided deforestation being the cheapest 
of the four project types. The literature is divided over the costs of avoided deforestation, 
though. While many studies find it to be the most cost-efficient sinks project type (e.g. 
Newell and Stavins 2000) others studies argue that costs are higher than in other projects 
because costs for addressing the causes of deforestation will have to be taken into account 
as well (e.g. Sathaye et al. 2001). In this assumed order of costs, plantations and 
agroforestry follow as the second and third cheapest project type. Although, they involve 
implementation costs, they generate income through marketable benefits. Regeneration 
                                                 
56 The exclusion of soil carbon can be justified by the uncertainties in soil carbon measurement as well as the 
high costs that will prevent most of the project developers from including soil carbon uptake in their carbon 
accounting. For details on this see Ellis (2000). Procedures for the accounting of carbon sequestration in wood 
products are in development, but will not be applicable for the first commitment period. 
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projects are assumed to involve higher net costs than all the other project types, since less 
marketable benefits accrue and regrowth is slower.  
 
Table 3-3: Cost differences between countries 
A/R costs Cost ($/tCO2) = D * X/C 
D = calibration parameter20,  
X = GDP/capita (PPP) in current 
international US$,  
C = carbon uptake factor for 
respective project type 
Cost of avoided 
deforestation Cost ($/tCO2) = D * 1/(0.07*C*L) 
D = calibration parameter20, 
C = carbon storage for respective 
project type,  




Cost differences of regrowth projects between countries are calculated considering 
differences in GDP per capita and the carbon uptake factors, while costs for avoided 
deforestation are assumed to be determined by scarcity of arable land and the carbon uptake 
factors of the project activity in the respective country (see Table 3-3).57 The cost estimates 
used for the development of the marginal sequestration cost curves are presented in 
Appendix C. The cost estimates in my standard analysis range mostly in the very low end 
of the cost estimates, but do not include negative costs which are often found in bottom-up 
studies. Since it is not very probable that the whole LULUCF potential will be available at 
such low costs, a sensitivity analysis with higher cost estimates is conducted.58 The bottom-
up marginal sink cost curves are developed by ordering the cumulative carbon 
sequestration/storage potentials, starting with the lowest cost option to the highest cost 
option. Then, steady marginal cost curves are obtained through an Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS)  regression.   
3.4. Model and policy scenarios 
For the analysis of the different LULUCF policy scenarios, I use the CERT model, which is 
a partial equilibrium model of the international greenhouse gas trading market. It is based 
on energy sector marginal abatement cost curves (MACs) and Business As Usual (BAU) 
                                                 
57 With the calibration parameter D, we are able to change the level of costs. The value of 0.07 in the 
calculation of avoided deforestation cost is part of the (assumed) function used to describe the relationship 
between the variables influencing the cost estimates.   
58 Calibration parameter D is set to 0.0005 for plantations, 0.0002 for agroforestry, 0.0009 for regeneration, 
and 0.14 for  avoided deforestation in the low cost case. For receiving the high cost estimates, we multiply D 
by 25.  
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data from the equilibrium models EPPA and GTEM.59 The CERT model comprises 6 
Annex B (USA, Japan, EU15, remaining OECD, Eastern Europe and the FSU) and 6 Non-
Annex B regions (Energy Exporting Countries, China, India, Dynamic Asian Economies, 
Brazil, Rest of the world) which are summarized in Table 3-4. 60 
Table 3-4: Country grouping of the CERT model 
























(Rest of the 
world) 
For the countries in each group, see Appendix C. 
 
Here, I use the GTEM MACs and BAU paths and only consider CO2. LULUCF options for 
Annex B Parties are included by deducting the Appendix Z sinks agreed upon at COP 7 in 
Marrakech from the reduction requirement, thus lowering demand of emissions certificates 
by this amount. Transaction costs associated with the generation of emissions certificates 
are set to 0.55 $/tCO2 for CDM projects and 0.27 $/tCO2 for Joint Implementation projects. 
In the reference scenario, the United States participate to some small extent in the 
international carbon market.61 I assume, Russia and eastern European countries to restrict 
supply of emissions permits by banking an amount of 722.3 MtCO2. This represents almost 
60% of their total hot air. 62  
Table 3-5 summarizes the four basic policy scenarios constructed for my analysis, each of 
them reflecting different decisions concerning project eligibility under the CDM. Scenario 
1 includes all four project types, and thus represents the policy debate before COP 7. 
Furthermore, I examine the effect of the 1% cap on the use of forestry CERs, by assuming 
the maximum amount of available forestry CERs to be equal to the maximum allowed 
amount of the 1% cap. 63  This is only applicable to scenarios where the carbon 
sequestration/storage potential is greater than the one defined by the 1 % cap. In the present 
study, this is only valid for the scenarios including avoided deforestation.  
                                                 
59 EPPA stands for  MIT´s “Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model, and GTEM for “Global Trade 
and Environment Model” of ABARE Australia. 
60 For the countries contained in each group, see Appendix C. 
61 Despite the repudiation of Kyoto Protocol on the national level, there is a considerable interest from the 
state and company level in the US. 
62 For studies on banking and market power see e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2003) as well as Löschel and 
Zhang (2002).  
63 Forner and Jotzo (2002) point out that a binding cap on demand might create a parallel market for forestry 
CER with different permit prices, because – contrary to our assumption here – an excess supply would drive 
forestry CER prices down. However, a further analysis of this is beyond of the scope of this paper.  
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Table 3-5: Policy scenarios 
No. Scenario Project types 
included 
1% cap 
0 No LULUCF* -- -- 
1a No 
1b 
AD P, AF, R, AD Yes 
2 A/R all P, AF, R ** 
3 A/R I P, R ** 
4 A/R II AF, R ** 
* CDM implementation rate 100 %, participation rate USA 25 %, transaction costs 
CDM 0.55 $/tCO2, transaction cost Annex B 0.27 $/tCO2, 722.3 MtCO2 hot air 
banked 
* * 1% cap not binding, 
P : Plantations, AF: Agroforestry, R: Regeneration, AD: Avoided Deforestation 
 
 
Since avoided deforestation was excluded at COP 7, Scenario 2 to 4 include only the 
regrowth project types and refer to the discussion whether to explicitly exclude either 
agroforestry (scenario 3) or plantations (scenario 4) from the Kyoto definitions of forest for 
the CDM. Since no such exclusion was decided at COP 9 in Milan, scenario 2 represents 
the status quo of policy decisions concerning forestry in the CDM.  
When looking at the amount of potential forestry CERs that could be generated in the 
different scenarios, it becomes clear that the avoided deforestation potential of 3605.5 
million tCO2 could fulfill 223 % of reduction requirements of the Kyoto Protocol. 64 As 
mentioned above, the 1% cap gets binding at these levels (scenario 1b), which would limit 
the amount of  forestry CERs to 724.7 million tCO2, representing 44.8 % of total reduction 
requirements. For the scenarios 2 to 4, the potential of  forestry CERs lies between 300.4 
MtCO2 and 155.0 MtCO2, representing between 18.6 % and 9.6 % of the total reduction 
requirements. 
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Effect of including LULUCF in the CDM 
For analyzing the role of forestry in the CDM, I will examine the effects of an introduction 
of forestry in the CDM on the market price. The market price of emissions permits under 
my reference scenario without forestry in the CDM is 3.08 US$/tCO2.  
                                                 
64 The assumed reduction of USA is included in calculation of reduction requirements, although it is not based 
on Kyoto target (Total reduction requirement = 1617 Mio tCO2). Therefore, the percentage values of the 
LULUCF potentials of purely Kyoto based reduction requirements will be slightly bigger. Due to the hot air, 
FSU and Eastern Europe are not considered to have reduction requirements.  
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Figure 3-1 shows by how much the permit price is reduced due to an introduction of 
forestry in the CDM in the respective scenarios. The highest reduction of the permit price 
on the international market is shown in the scenarios including all four project types (1a 















1a 1b 2 3 4
 
Figure 3-1: Permit price in scenarios including forestry as compared to scenario without forestry in 
CDM (in $/tCO2) 
 
The 1% cap in scenario 1b does not have any effect on the market price in this case. When 
excluding avoided deforestation, the reduction in the permit price is considerably lower, 
leading to a market price of 2.43 $/tCO2 in both scenario 2 and 3. The exclusion of 
agroforestry (scenario 3) does not have any effect on the market price under the assumed 
settings. When additionally excluding plantations (scenario 4), the resulting market price is 
2.7 $/tCO2, thus representing a relatively small reduction of 0.38 $/tCO2.  
These price reductions seem to be considerable at first sight. But one has to put them in the 
context of market conditions in the reference scenario which are characterized by a very 
low market price as a result of the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol and the 
hot air available in the market. When comparing the effects of an introduction of forestry in 
the CDM with the ones exerted by the US withdrawal or the hot air, one can conclude that 
the first two are the main factors determining the market price, while forestry in the CDM - 
even when including avoided deforestation - plays a minor role.  
3.5.2. Distributional aspects 
The introduction of forestry in the CDM has implications for the distribution of costs and 
benefits between different countries. As shown in Table 3-6,  Annex B countries incur a 
total of 2353 million $ to fulfill their Kyoto obligations in the reference scenario without 
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forestry in the CDM. However, Eastern Europe and the FSU make a profit from hot air 
sales of 417 million $ and 2136 million $, respectively.  For Non-Annex B countries, the 
CDM without forestry projects gives the opportunity to gain 708.6 million $, with China 
getting the biggest (506.5 million $) and Brazil the smallest slice (4.9 million $) of the cake.  
Table 3-6: Redistribution of benefits and losses due to the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM 
Annex B 




Annex B  
costs in million $ 
0 
1552 463 1927 963 -417 -2136 2353 
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
1a 70.6 70.2 70.3 70.0 -76.7 -75.8 63.8 
1b 70.4 70.6 70.6 70.3 -77.2 -76.1 64.2 
2 21.2 21.4 21.4 21.2 -26.1 -25.3 16.8 
3 21.1 21.4 21.3 21.1 -26.1 -25.2 16.7 
4 12.2 12.3 12.3 12.1 -15.3 -14.7 9.4 
 
Non-Annex B 
Scenario  EEX China India DAE Brazil ROW Total Non-Annex B 
profits in million $ 
0 
56,1 506,5 56,4 25 4,9 59,6 708,6 
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
1a -62.7 -95.6 -61.7 -71.2 277.6 13.8 -77.6 
1b -74.0 -98.0 -71.3 -68.0 1055.1 -23.0 -78.6 
2 -4.5 -23.7 31.0 -24.0 198.0 18.5 -12.8 
3 1.8 -24.0 33.7 -21.6 228.6 18.6 -12.0 
4 31.0 -24.5 -12.9 -8.4 230.6 57.2 -10.0 
 
In general, the more forestry offsets are offered on the market, the more FSU and Eastern 
Europe lose their benefits from hot air trading, with percentage losses of more than three 
quarters in the scenarios including avoided deforestation. The opposite is true for the other 
Annex B countries. Their gain grows the more forestry project types are eligible and lies 
between ca. 12 % in scenario 4 and 70%  in scenario 1a.65 Annex B as a whole profit 
considerably from an introduction of LULUCF in the CDM because the overall compliance 
costs decrease 9.4% in the lowest (scenario 4) and 64.2 % in the highest case (scenario 1b).  
Although the amount of CERs exported from non-Annex B rises with the inclusion of 
forestry in the CDM the non-Annex B Parties still lose as a whole compared to the standard 
scenarios because this quantity effect is overcompensated by the price effect induced by the 
shrinking permit price. In the case with no policy restrictions on LULUCF (scenario 1a), 
                                                 
65 The profits of countries in percentage terms are very similar due to the fact that at the very low level of 3.08 
$/tCO2, the marginal abatement cost curves do not differ a lot neither in slope nor in level.   
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this loss reaches around 78 % of profits in the reference scenario. The loss decreases due 
the exclusion of avoided deforestation to around 13 %, being smallest in scenario 4 with 
10%. Consequently, the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM causes a redistribution from 
non-Annex B to Annex B countries. Furthermore, profits and losses are shifted inside the 
non-Annex B group. China belongs to the biggest loser in spite of its relatively big forestry 
potential, with losses reaching from around 24 % to 98 % of profits gained in a purely 
energy based CDM. The explanation for this is that its huge CDM potential from 
substitution of coal based electricity generation has still greater dimensions than its forestry 
potential.  
The DAE group is the second biggest loser, while the distribution of losses and profits for 
the Energy Exporting countries (EEX) and India depend on the project eligibility criteria 
applied. The country with the biggest gain is Brazil which can increase its rather small 
profits in the purely energy based CDM by 198 % (scenario 2) to 1055 % (scenario 1b). But 
also the ROW group representing the other Latin-American and all African countries gain 
from A/R in the CDM. This is due to the combination of a relatively low energy with a 
relatively high forestry CDM potential of most Latin-American and African countries. 
Especially promising for ROW would be a CDM without avoided deforestation and 
plantations as eligible forestry projects.   
3.5.3. Sensitivity analysis 
The carbon sequestration cost curves used for the scenario analysis are subject to various 
uncertainties. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis is conducted in order to examine the effects 
of a variation in the cost assumptions as well as the carbon uptake and storage factors.  
3.5.3.1. Costs 
Since the costs used for the above analysis are rather lower bound estimates, and the whole 
potential for LULUCF activities is probably not available at such low costs, I first develop 
another set of carbon sequestration cost curves on the basis of higher cost estimates for each 
of the four scenarios. The cost estimates are based on the same assumptions as the lower 
bound estimates, but the parameter D used for their calculation is multiplied by 25. The 
resulting costs are shown in Appendix C.  
Furthermore, the assumed order of costs might have an influence on the results. So is the 
widely used assumption that avoided deforestation is very cheap questionable because 
protecting a forest area would have to address the causes of deforestation and be far more 
than just putting a fence around the forest. Since the literature is not clear about the costs of 
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avoided deforestation, I also vary the used order of costs by assuming that avoided 
deforestation is now the most expensive project type.66 
3.5.3.1.1.  Effect on the market price  
When assuming rather higher price levels (with avoided deforestation still being the 
cheapest project type), the already small effects of forestry sinks in the CDM is reduced 
even further. Figure 3-2 presents the market prices for the higher cost level for each 
scenario shaded in grey, and the values for the low cost estimates as used in the standard 


























Figure 3-2: Permit price in forestry scenarios when varying the cost level (in $/tCO2) 
 
The reduction of the market price of carbon dioxide is small even in the scenarios including 
avoided deforestation, and insignificant (scenarios 2 and 3) or even zero (scenario 4) in the 
ones only including A/R.  
Results for the described variation in the order of costs are represented in Figure 3-3 for 
low as well as high cost levels. The relatively high effect of scenario 1 on the market price 
in the standard scenarios is significantly reduced when avoided deforestation is assumed to 
be the most expensive instead of the cheapest project type. This counts even more for the 
high cost scenario (dotted black plot) in which even the inclusion of avoided deforestation 
would not lead to any effect on the market price.  
 
                                                 
66 The default value D in the formula for the calculation of avoided deforestation cost is set to 6 for the low 
cost and multiplied by 25 for high cost levels. 
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Figure 3-3: Permit price with varying cost order, avoided deforestation least vs. most expensive at low 
and high cost levels (in $/tCO2) 
 
Therefore, I can conclude that most of the arguments broad up against the inclusion of 
avoided deforestation in the CDM have been based on the assumption that costs of this 
project type are very low. If avoided deforestation is considerably more expensive than 
widely thought, its inclusion would have a negligible effect on the market.67   
3.5.3.1.2.  Distributional aspects 
If assuming a higher cost level (but not changing the cost order), it is obvious that Annex B 
countries would profit less of an introduction of forestry in the CDM. The changed 
redistribution of profits and losses is presented in Table 3-7. The pattern of redistribution 
remains more or less unchanged, while the level of profits and losses decreases.  
Under the assumption of higher costs, Annex B countries as a whole could shift profits of 
only 17% (scenario 1b) away from non-Annex B countries, while the actual outcome of 
negotiations represented by scenario 2 shows only a small redistribution towards Annex B.   
When looking at the redistribution inside the non-Annex B group, the pattern changes 
slightly as compared to the scenarios using low cost levels. China and DAE lose, while 
Brazil is the only clear winner of any kind of introduction of forestry in the CDM. 
 
                                                 
67 It has to be mentioned, though, that projects including conservation aspects are subject to difficulties in the 
baseline construction. There would always be a perverse incentive to drive national deforestation rates up to 
earn more credits from avoiding deforestation or conservation. This has been one of the major concern 
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Table 3-7: Redistribution of benefits and losses due to the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM, high cost 
estimates 
Annex B 




Annex B  
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
1a 30.6 30.9 30.8 30.5 -36.9 -35.9 24.8 
1b 21.8 22.0 22.1 21.8 -26.9 -26.1 17.3 
2 3.9 4.1 4.0 3.9 -11.5 -4.9 2.9 
3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 -7.0 -6.6 4.0 
4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 -0.7 -0.7 0.4 
Non-Annex B 
Scenario  EEX China India DAE Brazil ROW Total Non-Annex B 
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
1a -3.9 -57.0 -12.1 -10.4 744.9 122.1 -27.0 
1b -10.3 -45.7 -9.8 -0.8 1451.0 69.5 -18.4 
2 5.0 -4.8 11.7 -8.0 6.1 -5.2 -2.8 
3 18.0 -7.4 39.2 -11.2 6.1 -8.7 -1.8 
4 2.1 -1.2 -0.5 -0.4 14.3 2.9 -0.4 
 
 
Benefits and losses in the scenarios without avoided deforestation follow a less clear 
pattern for all the other countries and groups. For the ROW group, profits in the scenarios 
with avoided deforestation are lost if the 1 % cap is considered, while benefits in all the 
other scenarios increase, especially in the scenario which only includes regeneration and 
agroforestry.   
3.5.3.2. Carbon uptake and storage factors 
Since the carbon uptake and storage factors used in the standard scenarios are rather 
optimistic, I conduct the scenario analysis for a set of lower estimates of per hectare carbon 
sequestration and storage. It has to be reminded that, based on my assumptions, not only 
LULUCF potentials but also the costs are affected by a variation in carbon sequestration 
and storage factors.  
3.5.3.2.1. Effect on the market price 
The effects of lower carbon sequestration and storage estimates are shown in Figure 3-4. 
Lower uptake and storage factors lead to slightly higher market prices. In general, price 



















Figure 3-4: Permit price with varying carbon uptake/storage factors (in $/tCO2) 
 
3.5.3.2.2. Distributional aspects 
For Annex B countries, benefits and losses decrease in the case of lower uptake and storage 
to some extent (see Table 3-8), but follow the same pattern of redistribution as in the 
standard scenario.  
Table 3-8: Redistribution of benefits and losses due to the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM, low 
carbon uptake/storage 
Annex B 




Annex B  
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
1a 52.7 52.9 52.9 52.6 -60.4 -59.3 45.6 
1b 64.0 64.4 64.3 64.1 -71.5 -70.3 57.3 
2 9.1 9.3 9.2 9.1 -11.5 -11.1 7.0 
3 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.8 -12.5 -11.9 7.5 
4 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 -2.6 -2.4 1.4 
Non-Annex B 
Scenario  EEX China India DAE Brazil ROW Total Non-Annex B 
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
1a -15.0 -79.9 -52.3 -38.4 677.6 93.6 -51.2 
1b -55.3 -95.1 -85.6 -56.0 1722.4 12.9 -68.2 
2 8.0 -4.3 36.2 -12.8 77.6 -5.0 0.1 
3 14.1 -5.2 47.3 -8.8 149.0 -3.0 1.7 
4 -3.2 -3.9 0.2 2.4 81.6 12.6 -1.3 
 
The group of Annex B countries can gain up to 57 % in the scenario including avoided 



























are reduced to 7 %, while in scenario 4 almost no benefits remain. Non-Annex B countries 
as a whole lose up to almost 70 % in scenario 1b, but are more or less unaffected in the 
other three scenarios. Of all non-Annex B countries, Brazil is the biggest winner again. 
Brazil and ROW can even increase their benefits in the avoided deforestation scenarios (as 
compared to the standard scenarios), while all the other countries are still encountering 
significant losses. China remains the country losing the most, although the size of the losses 
decreases especially for the scenarios without avoided deforestation. 
The pattern of redistribution for the scenarios only including A/R is as unclear as before, 
especially for the energy exporting countries (EEX), DAE and ROW.  The latter two again 
profit most if only agroforestry and regeneration are eligible CDM activities.  
3.6. Country positions in climate negotiations 
As described in Chapter 2, the negotiation on Art. 3.3 and 3.4 can be seen as a renegotiation 
of emissions targets, which was only possible due to the fact that the targets were 
negotiated before the rules and modalities of the Kyoto Protocol were agreed on. It can only 
be suspected that the negotiations on the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM, and on its 
rules and modalities were driven by a similar interest. Some Annex B countries might have 
been hoping to decrease their compliance cost while non-Annex B countries with low 
energy CDM potential, and especially the ones that had invested in forestry projects in the 
AIJ phase, wanted LULUCF to be included in the CDM in a way as broad as possible 
(Scholz 2002).  
In the following, it is examined how far the results of the scenario analysis concerning the 
redistribution of benefits and losses due to the introduction of LULUCF in the CDM can 
explain the respective country positions on the subject in the climate negotiations. Table 3-
9 summarizes the results obtained from the scenario analysis, showing which countries win 
or lose due to an introduction of LULUCF in the CDM. These benefits and losses are 
differentiated for an introduction of LULUCF with avoided deforestation and with A/R 
only. Additionally, the respective country positions are included in the table showing if a 
country has been in favor of accounting for LULUCF in Annex B inventories (Art. 3.3/3.4), 
and if it has been in favor of avoided deforestation and/or A/R as eligible CDM activities.  
It becomes obvious that country positions concerning LULUCF are not defined along the 
lines of the negotiating coalitions formed in the frame of the climate regime. Can the 
benefits and losses of an introduction of LULUCF in the CDM account for this?  
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Table 3-9: Winners and losers of an inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM as compared to country 
positions 
Annex B 





Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
With avoided deforestation  
(scenario 1a,b) +++ +++ +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
A/R only (scenarios 2) +++ +++ +++ +++ --- --- +++ 
In favor of …. in negotiations 
LULUCF Art. 3.3/3.4 4 4 - 4 - 4 ? 
Avoided deforestation 4 4 - 4 - - ? CDM 
A/R 4 4 - 4 - - ? 
 
Non-Annex B 
 EEX China India DAE Brazil ROW Total Non-Annex B 
Profits (- = Losses) compared to scenario 0 in % 
With avoided deforestation  
(scenario 1a,b) --- --- --- --- +++ + --- 
A/R only (scenarios 2) + --- +++ --- +++ + -- 
In favor of …. in negotiations 
LULUCF Art. 3.3/3.4 4 - - ? - ? ? 
Avoided deforestation 4 - - ? - 4 ? CDM 
A/R 4 - - ? 4 4 ? 
Based on the results of table 3-6, 3-7 and 3-8:  
 +++ clear winner, --- clear loser,  + probably some profits, - probably some losses 
4 in favor, - opposing, ? no common group position                       
Country positions based on Michaelowa and Greiner (2001) and Jung et al. (2005) 
 
In quite a number of cases, the country positions coincide with respective profits and losses. 
The USA, Japan and the group including other OECD countries like Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and Norway were the main forces pushing towards a broad inclusion of 
LULUCF ever since the beginning (Anderson et al. 2001; Jung et al. 2005). 
The results confirm partly that an active pro-sinks position might have been driven by the 
interest of  lowering the own compliance cost. The European Union, however, has been 
opposing LULUCF in the CDM, in spite of being able to gain from its inclusion. This 
situation could be explained by the leadership role which the European Union has been 
trying to take over in the climate regime as well as the weak influence of interest groups in 
the EU pushing for the subject. The Eastern European countries and Russia have been 
rejecting LULUCF in the CDM as well, but due to different reasons. A broad inclusion of 
LULUCF in the CDM would probably lead to a devaluation of the hot air held by these 
countries. In spite of this, Russia used the negotiation on country specific forest 
management caps - known as Appendix Z - to double its own amount of forest management 
activities (Michaelowa and Greiner 2001).  
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For non-Annex B countries the picture is even more complex. In the negotiations, the group 
of Non-Annex B countries represented in the Group 77 and China has been divided over 
the question whether to include LULUCF in the CDM - with most of the Latin American 
countries having been in favor and most of the Asian countries having been against it 
(Anderson et al. 2001). Here, the economic gains and losses seem to explain some of the 
country positions as well. Especially China, but also India has been the greatest opponents 
of the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM. While the position of China derives from the 
clear losses from any kind of introduction of LULULCF in the CDM, results for India show 
at least some profits if only A/R is eligible under the CDM.  However, the most interesting 
case in the Group 77 and China is Brazil which was rejecting the inclusion of avoided 
deforestation in the CDM although belonging to the countries which could gain 
considerably. This position and the active role Brazil took in the negotiations to prevent 
avoided deforestation from being included may be explained by political reasons, like the 
strong position of Brazil in the G77 group as well as sovereignty concerns about the 
amount of foreign investment in the Amazon region (Fearnside 2001; Michaelowa and 
Greiner 2001).68  
3.7. Uncertainties and limits of the analysis 
The basis of my analysis is the development of  carbon sequestration costs curves which are 
subject to uncertainties about the potentials and costs they are based on. The literature 
review shows that the comparison of studies of carbon sequestration costs and potentials is 
rather problematic. Furthermore, other important cost elements, e.g. land cost, benefits, 
transaction costs69 are neglected widely, leading to a wide range of estimates for costs and 
carbon sequestration potentials. Due to the lack of a solid cost data set for the development 
of my carbon sequestration cost curves, I had to rely on a number of assumptions rather 
than empirical results.  
Additionally, the calculation of demand for emissions permits in the CERT model does not 
consider political preferences toward non- CDM and non-sinks permits. The European 
Union, with the exception of some individual countries70, rejects forestry CERs for the 
fulfillment of its own compliance and has excluded LULUCF from the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme (Commission of the European Community 2003). The remaining buyer 
                                                 
68 For a detailed analysis of negotiating positions, see Chapter 2.  
69 At such low market prices as resulting from our study, transaction costs become a really important subject, 
because they might turn into a decisive factor for projects implementation. However, little is known on 
transaction costs of CDM projects still. Some examples of transaction cost studies for forestry projects are van 
Kooten et al. (2002) and Milne (1999) 
70 The Netherlands, Austria and Denmark 
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countries Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland may put emphasis on 
domestic sinks under Art. 3 of the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, the countries actually 
demanding forestry CERs might be limited to Japan, Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands 
and Canada (Bernoux et al. 2002). Consequently, due to political preferences the demand 
for forestry CERs might be smaller than assumed by the model, which additionally 
decreases the role of LULUCF in the CDM in the first commitment period. On the other 
hand, the total demand for emissions permits in the CERT model might be underestimated, 
because it is assumed that Annex B countries will use all of the emissions permits they own 
or buy to fulfill their obligations in the first commitment period. The CERT model is a 
static partial equilibrium model considering the first commitment period only, and is not 
able to account for banking of emissions permits. The analysis suggests that the permit 
prices in the first commitment period will probably be very low. One strategy that Annex B 
countries might follow is the banking of all bankable71 emissions permit while using a 
greater amount of forestry CERs for complying with their first commitment period target. 
This way, they could take advantage of the relatively cheap emissions reductions in the first 
commitment period and carry some of them over to the second commitment period.    
3.8. Conclusion 
The goal of my analysis is to examine the consequences of policy decisions on the 
inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM on the international market of emissions permits. 
Although, a vast literature on carbon sequestration costs has developed in the last two 
decades, it does not provide us with data for an analysis at global level. I, therefore, develop 
a set of carbon sequestration cost curves based on the knowledge available, and conduct a 
scenario analysis by running the partial equilibrium model CERT with different 
assumptions on the eligibility of forestry projects in the CDM. By doing so, I try to shed 
some light on which effects policy decisions regarding the inclusion of forestry in the CDM 
will have on the market price, as well as on the redistribution of losses and benefits 
between countries. Since the negotiation on the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM has been 
a heavily debated issue in the climate regime, furthermore I investigate if such economic 
incentives can explain the negotiating position of countries in the climate regime.  
In general, the greater reduction in permit price occur in the scenarios including avoided 
deforestation, leading to a market price of 0.9 $/tCO2 as compared to the 3.08 $/tCO2 in the 
reference scenario without LULUCF. The scenarios including only A/R lead to 
significantly lower reductions which range from 0.76 $/tCO2 to 0.38 $/tCO2. Compared to 
                                                 
71 While LULUCF credits are not bankable, all other emissions permits are. 
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the effects exerted by the withdrawal of the US from the Kyoto Protocol and the hot air in 
the system, the reductions due to the inclusion of LULUCF in the CDM are rather small. 
Since the above results are based on relatively optimistic assumptions, the already small 
effects on the market price shrink even further if higher cost levels and lower carbon uptake 
factors are considered. Furthermore, the great reduction in permit price and, therefore, in 
compliance cost expected from an inclusion of avoided deforestation are mainly based on 
the assumptions of very low costs for this project type. If, however, avoided deforestation is 
assumed to be more expensive than widely thought, the relatively big effects of avoided 
deforestation on the carbon market disappear almost entirely. 
The LULUCF issue has been a very controversial one ever since the beginning of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The rules, modalities and procedures adopted at COP 9 are the result of an 
intense negotiating process driven by the different interest of countries. Since emissions 
reduction targets were agreed upon before the concrete rules and modalities of the Kyoto 
Protocol had been adopted, the rules for the inclusion on forestry in the CDM had some 
implications for the compliance cost of Annex B countries, as well as the respective 
benefits from CDM projects for non-Annex B countries. Redistribution of benefits and 
losses due to the introduction of forestry in the CDM takes place along three lines running 
between Annex B and non-Annex B countries, and inside the group of Annex B as well as 
the group of non-Annex B Parties. The analysis shows that Annex B countries as a whole 
profit from forestry in the CDM, while non-Annex B countries lose or remain unaffected. 
The greatest profits for Annex B can be expected if LULUCF is not restricted to A/R only. 
In spite of these profits for Annex B, Russia and the eastern European countries lose from 
such an introduction of LULUCF because their hot air is devaluated. Inside the non-Annex 
B group, profits are shifted away from China and the Dynamic Asian Economies, while 
Brazil is profiting most, especially if avoided deforestation is an eligible activity in the 
CDM. While, at least in most cases, the African and the other Latin-American can expect 
some considerable profits, for India and the energy exporting countries there are only 
profits if avoided deforestation is excluded from the CDM. This basic pattern of 
redistribution seems to be relatively robust to a variation in cost level as well as carbon 
uptake and storage factors.  
The benefits and losses countries encounter due to the introduction of LULUCF in the 
CDM seem to explain some country negotiating positions concerning LULUCF in the 
CDM. In general, countries with clear losses have been opposing forestry in the CDM, 
while some countries with clear profits have been in favor. The latter does not count for 
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Brazil and the EU who could profit economically from a policy they have been rejecting in 
the negotiations.  
The huge effort made for the negotiation of rules and modalities for LULUCF in the 
climate regime and the small role it will probably play in the fulfillment of reduction 
requirements of the first commitment period lead to the question whether the first is in any 
way proportional to the latter. However, the success of LULUCF cannot only be measured 
in tons of CO2, but in its contribution to keeping certain countries on board of the climate 
regime. In spite of this rather small role in the first commitment period, LULUCF might 
turn into an important element of the negotiation of reduction targets of future commitment 
periods. The practical experience, the progress in reducing uncertainties in carbon 
measurement and the credibility of forestry projects implemented in the first commitment 
period will be decisive for decisions to be taken on the inclusion of LULUCF in a possible 








Table 3-10: LULUCF potentials of considered  Non-Annex B countries – first commitment period (in tCO2) 
Project type Plantations Avoided deforestation Agroforestry Regeneration Total carbon 
Uptake factors Low high low high low high low High low high 
EEX 9,900,000 14,850,000 247,500,000 392,333,333 48,125 110,689 1,191,667 2,383,333 258,639,792 409,677,356 
Indonesia 9,166,667 13,750,000 165,000,000 297,000,000 45,833 105,417 275,000 550,000 174,487,500 311,405,417 
Venezuela 733,333 1,100,000 82,500,000 95,333,333 2,292 5,273 916,667 1,833,333 84,152,292 98,271,939 
CHN 46,530,000 76,774,500 10,807,500 16,211,250 4,766,667 10,963,333 10,500,417 31,501,250 72,604,583 135,450,333 
IND 18,333 27,500 24,750,000 41,250,000 22,917 52,708 916,667 1,833,333 25,707,917 43,163,542 
DAE 1,549,167 2,328,333 49,500,000 86,625,000 128,333 295,167 2,429,167 4,904,167 53,606,667 94,152,667 
Malaysia 55,000 82,500 0 0 9,167 21,083 550,000 1,100,000 614,167 1,203,583 
Philippines 1,466,667 2,200,000 30,937,500 55,687,500 114,583 263,542 1,833,333 3,666,667 34,352,083 61,817,708 
Thailand 27,500 45,833 18,562,500 30,937,500 4,583 10,542 45,833 137,500 18,640,417 31,131,375 
BRA 9,166,667 13,750,000 464,062,500 773,437,500 45,833 105,417 13,750,000 27,500,000 487,025,000 814,792,917 
ROW 4,995,833 8,075,833 912,326,250 1,611,885,000 1,796,256 4,131,384 26,532,917 61,485,417 945,651,256 1,685,577,634 
Bolivia 27,500 45,833 18,562,500 30,937,500 4,583 10,542 45,833 137,500 18,640,417 31,131,375 
Chile 275,000 550,000 0 0 1,833 4,217 18,333 55,000 295,167 609,217 
Colombia 183,333 275,000 222,750,000 371,250,000 45,833 105,417 1,833,333 3,666,667 224,812,500 375,297,083 
Costa Rica 110,000 165,000 6,187,500 12,375,000 22,917 52,708 183,333 366,667 6,503,750 12,959,375 
Ecuador 82,500 137,500 148,500,000 247,500,000 45,833 105,417 458,333 1,375,000 149,086,667 249,117,917 
Guatemala 73,333 110,000 16,706,250 27,843,750 45,833 105,417 458,333 916,667 17,283,750 28,975,833 
Guyana 0 0 0 0 0 0 183,333 366,667 183,333 366,667 
Honduras 18,333 27,500 24,750,000 41,250,000 22,917 52,708 916,667 1,833,333 25,707,917 43,163,542 
Mexico 550,000 825,000 57,750,000 123,750,000 458,333 1,054,167 9,166,667 18,333,333 67,925,000 143,962,500 
Nicaragua 55,000 82,500 0 0 9,167 21,083 550,000 1,100,000 614,167 1,203,583 
Panama 18,333 27,500 33,000,000 49,500,000 18,333 42,167 183,333 366,667 33,220,000 49,936,333 
Paraguay 82,500 137,500 23,100,000 49,500,000 32,083 73,792 183,333 550,000 23,397,917 50,261,292 
Peru 137,500 229,167 0 0 22,917 52,708 916,667 2,750,000 1,077,083 3,031,875 
Suriname 0 0 0 0 48 106 146,667 293,333 146,714 293,440 
ROW, Latin America 1,613,333 2,612,500 551,306,250 953,906,250 730,631 1,680,448 15,244,167 32,110,833 568,894,381 990,310,031 
Bangladesh 366,667 550,000 0 0 114,583 263,542 0 0 481,250 813,542 
Myanmar 366,667 550,000 0 0 22,917 52,708 2,200,000 4,400,000 2,589,583 5,002,708 
Lao 275,000 412,500 0 0 0 0 458,333 916,667 733,333 1,329,167 
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Project type Plantations Avoided deforestation Agroforestry Regeneration Total carbon 
Uptake factors Low high low high low high low high low high 
Papua New Guinea 36,667 55,000 0 0 9,167 21,083 1,833,333 3,666,667 1,879,167 3,742,750 
Vietnam 275,000 412,500 0 0 0 0 458,333 916,667 733,333 1,329,167 
ROW, Asia 1,320,000 1,980,000 0 0 146,667 337,333 4,950,000 9,900,000 6,416,667 12,217,333 
Angola 137,500 229,167 0 0 4,583 10,542 183,333 550,000 325,417 789,708 
Benin 27,500 45,833 7,218,750 15,468,750 11,458 26,356 183,333 550,000 7,441,042 16,090,939 
Botswana 0 0 3,465,000 7,425,000 9,167 21,083 22,917 68,750 3,497,083 7,514,833 
Burkina Faso 68,750 114,583 4,331,250 6,187,500 45,833 105,417 458,333 1,375,000 4,904,167 7,782,500 
Cameroon 27,500 45,833 41,250,000 74,250,000 114,583 263,542 275,000 825,000 41,667,083 75,384,375 
Central African R. 13,750 22,917 11,343,750 20,418,750 34,375 79,064 18,333 55,000 11,410,208 20,575,731 
Chad 13,750 22,917 4,620,000 6,600,000 13,750 31,625 18,333 55,000 4,665,833 6,709,542 
Congo 137,500 229,167 0 0 4,583 10,542 183,333 550,000 325,417 789,708 
Congo D. Rep 68,750 114,583 0 0 45,833 105,417 916,667 2,750,000 1,031,250 2,970,000 
Cote d´Ivoire 137,500 229,167 103,125,000 185,625,000 45,833 105,417 458,333 1,375,000 103,766,667 187,334,583 
Ethiopia 412,500 687,500 618,750 1,031,250 91,667 210,833 183,333 550,000 1,306,250 2,479,583 
Gabon 55,000 91,667 0 0 0 0 0 0 55,000 91,667 
Ghana 55,000 91,667 0 0 11,458 26,356 91,667 275,000 158,125 393,023 
Guinea 68,750 114,583 10,395,000 22,275,000 22,917 52,708 183,333 550,000 10,670,000 22,992,292 
Kenya 137,500 229,167 0 0 68,750 158,125 0 0 206,250 387,292 
Madagascar 27,500 45,833 24,750,000 41,250,000 2,292 5,273 91,667 275,000 24,871,458 41,576,106 
Mali 13,750 22,917 0 0 9,167 21,083 45,833 137,500 68,750 181,500 
Mozambique 55,000 91,667 0 0 11,458 26,356 550,000 1,650,000 616,458 1,768,023 
Niger 27,500 45,833 3,465,000 4,950,000 22,917 52,708 45,833 137,500 3,561,250 5,186,042 
Nigeria 412,500 687,500 24,750,000 41,250,000 68,750 158,125 91,667 275,000 25,322,917 42,370,625 
Senegal 27,500 45,833 11,550,000 24,750,000 91,667 210,833 229,167 687,500 11,898,333 25,694,167 
Somalia 27,500 45,833 2,887,500 6,187,500 22,917 52,708 137,500 412,500 3,075,417 6,698,542 
Sudan 137,500 229,167 46,200,000 99,000,000 22,917 52,708 916,667 2,750,000 47,277,083 102,031,875 
Tanzania 82,500 137,500 33,000,000 66,000,000 68,750 158,125 916,667 2,750,000 34,067,917 69,045,625 
Uganda 82,500 137,500 14,850,000 24,750,000 45,833 105,417 91,667 275,000 15,070,000 25,267,917 
Zambia 27,500 45,833 6,600,000 6,893,333 4,583 10,542 45,833 137,500 6,677,917 7,087,208 
Zimbabwe 55,000 91,667 6,600,000 3,666,667 22,917 52,708 458,333 1,375,000 7,136,250 5,186,042 
Africa 2,337,500 3,895,833 361,020,000 657,978,750 918,958 2,113,606 6,797,083 20,391,250 371,073,542 684,379,439 






Table 3-11: Annex B countries in the grouping of the CERT model 
GTEM 
name 
Countries in GTEM 
USA United States of America 
JPN Japan 
EEC 
15 EU members: includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,  
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
UK 
OOE Rest OECD; Includes: Australia, Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway,  Switzerland 
EET Economies in Transition of Eastern Europe; Includes: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech  Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
FSU Soviet Union; Includes: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine 
 
Table 3-12: Non-Annex B countries in the grouping of the CERT model 
 GTEM  LULUCF cost curves 
EEX Energy Exporting Countries; 
Includes: Algeria,  Bahrain, 
Botswana, Swaziland, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Libya, Namibia, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
South Africa, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, Venezuela, 
Yemen.  
Indonesia, Venezuela 
CHN Includes China and Chinese 
Taipei China 
IND India India 
DAE Dynamic Asian Economies; 
Includes:  Philippines, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea, 
Thailand 
Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand 
BRA Brazil Brazil 
ROW 
Rest of the World (all other 
Non-Annex B countries) 
Bolivia, Chile,  Colombia, Costa Rica,  Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,  Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Lao, Papua New Guinea, 
Vietnam, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Congo D. Rep., Cote d´Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, 





Table 3-13: Average cost estimates in $/tCO2 for each project type and country/region, low cost 
scenario 
Low costs ($/tCO2) EEX* China India DAE* Brazil ROW* 
Low uptake 
Plantations 0.11 0.27 0.08 0.19 0.26 0.15 
Agroforestry 0.35 0.43 0.26 0.62 0.83 0.34 
Regeneration 0.40 1.95 0.29 0.70 0.94 0.73 
Avoided deforestation 
(cheap) 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 
Avoided deforestation 
(expensive) 2.39 5.24 3.20 2.54 1.10 3.08 
high uptake 
Plantations 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.09 
Agroforestry 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.27 0.36 0.15 
Regeneration 0.20 0.65 0.14 0.35 0.47 0.28 
Avoided deforestation 
(cheapest) 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Avoided deforestation (most 
expensive) 1.38 3.50 0.92 1.37 0.66 1.79 
*For the country grouping used, see Appendix B. The potentials for which these average costs 
are estimated are shown in Appendix A. 
 
 
Table 3-14: Average cost estimates in $/tCO2 for each project type and country/region, high cost 
scenario 
High costs ($/tCO2) EEX* China India DAE* Brazil ROW* 
Low uptake 
Plantations 10.15 24.90 7.40 17.77 23.80 14.10 
Agroforestry 32.47 39.80 23.60 56.86 76.30 31.53 
Regeneration 36.53 178.90 26.50 63.97 85.80 66.80 
Avoided deforestation 
(cheap) 5.10 11.20 6.90 5.40 2.30 6.60 
Avoided deforestation 
(expensive) 219.35 480.9 293.7 232.87 100.40 282.50 
high uptake 
Plantations 6.80 15.10 4.90 11.90 15.90 8.30 
Agroforestry 14.10 17.30 10.30 24.70 33.20 13.70 
Regeneration 18.30 59.60 13.30 32.00 42.90 25.40 
Avoided deforestation 
(cheapest) 3.00 7.50 2.00 2.90 1.40 3.80 
Avoided deforestation  
(most expensive) 126.80 320.60 83.90 126.00 60.20 164.00 
*For the country grouping used, see Appendix B. The potentials for which these average costs 





































4. Host country attractiveness for CDM projects72 
4.1. Introduction 
While the analysis in Chapter 4 is based on the underlying assumption that the amount 
of forestry projects taking place in non-Annex I countries is purely determined by the 
respective potential for forestry projects and their related costs, other factors might play 
a role for CDM investment flows as well. Therefore, in the following I investigate the 
attractiveness of CDM host countries, taking further aspects influencing CDM 
investments into account.  
Annex I countries can provide financing for CDM projects either via equity investment 
(co-)financing the emission reduction project, via forward purchases or by buying the 
already produced ’certified emission reduction’ (CER) on the secondary market. 73 
According to a recent decision of the Executive Board, CERs can also be created by 
unilateral CDM projects.74 After the main rules governing the CDM were decided at the 
Seventh Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 7) in 2001, a process of 
refinement of implementation modalities and the development of the necessary 
infrastructure for the complex CDM project cycle began. While the overall contribution 
of CDM in the compliance of Annex I countries will depend on a variety of different 
factors outside the influence of host countries, the distribution of the CDM investment 
does and will depend mainly on the attractiveness of host countries for the CDM.75 
Against the background of the entering into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 
2005 and the kick-off of the CDM market, the question arises how CDM investment 
flows will be distributed between the potential host countries. This is especially relevant, 
since Decision 17/CP.7 of the Marrakech Accords emphasizes the importance of an 
equitable geographic distribution of clean development mechanism project activities at 
regional and sub regional levels (UNFCCC 2001b).  
Often the simplistic assumption is used that CDM flows mainly follow the pattern of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Arquit Niederberger and Saner (2005) criticize 
this assumption and clarify CDM-related determinants of FDI flows. Fankhauser and 
Lavric (2003) study the attractiveness of JI host countries, and identify three factors 
determining the attractiveness of a JI host country:  
                                                 
72 This chapter is based on Jung (2005a) 
73 See also Arquit Niederberger and Saner (2005)  
74 For a detailed study on  unilateral CDM , see Jahn et al. (2004) 
75 This is true for almost all of the forms of CDM investment, however, not for the unilateral CDM. While 
forward purchase agreements allow buyers to reduce the risks involved in a concrete CDM project, the 
risk of CER accrual remains. Here country risks play an important role. 
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- the scope for cheap emission reductions,  
- the institutional capacity of a host country to process JI deals, and 
- the general investment climate. 
These factors apply to CDM investment as well as for JI76 and are used in the following 
as a basis for defining the attractiveness of CDM host countries for CDM projects. The 
analysis is, however, limited to non-sink projects, since data on the potentials for CDM 
forestry projects is not available for such a big set of countries as the one included in the 
present study.77   
Instead of relying on the assumption that CDM flows follow the same pattern as FDI 
flows or are only determined by the mitigation potential, I use the explorative tool of 
cluster analysis to take into account all three factors identified by Fankhauser and Lavric 
(2003) in the classification of CDM host countries. Cluster analysis is a multivariate 
statistical procedure that identifies relatively homogenous groups of elements in a given 
data set. It has to be emphasized, though, that cluster analysis is an explorative tool, 
based on different plausible algorithms.78 It is therefore useful for developing a first 
classification or investigating a conceptual scheme for grouping elements, which can 
help to improve the understanding of the respective issue (Aldenderfer and Blashfeld 
1984, Bacher 2002, Mucha 1992).  
The host country classification based on the attractiveness of countries for CDM non-
sink projects provides a first picture of what the distribution of CDM flows might look 
like in a mature CDM market. While the present study is concerned with a more general 
picture, host country ratings (for example the one by Point Carbon79) are much more 
detailed, but focused on a smaller set of countries. Therefore, both can be seen as 
complementary approaches in analyzing CDM host country attractiveness.   
4.2. Indicators for host country attractiveness 
For using the three factors emission reduction potential, institutional CDM capacity and 
general investment climate in the cluster analysis, appropriate indicators have to be 
identified. 114 host countries for which the respective data was available are included in 
the analysis. The indicators used in this analysis are summarized in Table 4-1 below. 
                                                 
76 This is supported by a survey conducted by Point Carbon (2002) which identifies a supportive CDM 
approval system as well as the investment climate as the most important factors influencing CDM 
investment.  
77 The only comprehensive estimation of potentials for CDM forestry is the one of Trexler and Haugen 
(1995), which, however, only includes around 50 developing countries.  
78 The software package CLUSTAN is used for the analysis. 
79 For details see: http://www.pointcarbon.com/category.php?categoryID=723 
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While Fankhauser and Lavric (2003) use expected carbon emissions per GDP as a 
measure of a countries´ emission reduction potential, I argue that the expected absolute 
greenhouse gas emissions are a better indicator. First, the absolute value of emissions is 
more appropriate because the indicator emission intensity (e.g. CO2 emissions/GDP) is 
not comparable due to its complex formation and the different factors influencing the 
level of this indicator (Sun 2000). Secondly, only focusing on CO2 is not sufficient to 
reflect the wide range of greenhouse gas emission reduction options eligible under the 
CDM; currently most of the CDM projects actually reduce non-CO2 gases.80 The data on 
greenhouse gas emissions81 in 2001, taken from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool - 
CAIT - (WRI 2003) are used in the following as an indicator for emission reduction 
potential in CDM host countries.  
Table 4-1: Indicators of host country attractiveness for non-sink CDM projects 
Dimension Variable 
Emission reduction potential (in the non-sink 
sector) 
Expected greenhouse gas emissions in 2010 (Gg 
CO2) 
Institutional CDM capacity 
Index (0-4) based on: 
- Kyoto ratification, 
- AIJ experience, 
- CDM authority (DNA) installed timely, 
- National Strategy Study (NSS) completed 
General investment climate 
 
Index based on averages (1994-2003) of three 
dimensions of World Bank World Governance 
Research Indicators Dataset 
 
 
Until emission reduction credits can be generated by a CDM project, projects have to 
pass a relatively complex project cycle. As prerequisites for a CDM project to be 
submitted to the Executive Board, the country has to have ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
and is obliged to have a Designated National Authority (DNA) operating. The latter has 
to approve the CDM project activity and confirm that it is complying with the national 
definition of sustainability. For setting-up a well-functioning and efficient DNA, there is 
a need for expert knowledge inside the government on rules and modalities governing 
                                                 
80 Of the projects available for validation comments on the UNFCCC CDM website by Feb. 10 2005, 84% 
of estimated CERs come from non-CO2 gases. 
81 It has to be mentioned, though, that there may be large uncertainties concerning the non-fossil fuel-
related greenhouse gas emissions of developing countries.   
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the CDM.82 It can be assumed that those countries which participated in the AIJ pilot 
phase (Activities Implemented Jointly), and completed a National Strategy Study 
analyzing their CDM potential will be able to profit from the experiences and knowledge 
gained. Therefore, the indicators ratification of the Kyoto Protocol83, participation in the 
AIJ pilot phase, timely establishment of a Designed National Authority (DNA)84 as well 
as completion of a National Strategy Study (NSS)85 form an index representing the 
institutional CDM capacity of a CDM host country86.  
As an indicator for the general investment climate, I create an index based on the World 
Governance Research Indicators Dataset87, using the dimensions of political stability, 
regulatory quality and rule of law.88  
The data exploration shows that those host countries with higher greenhouse gas 
emissions tend to have built up a better institutional CDM capacity. While there is no 
significant correlation of the mitigation potential of a country with its investment climate, 
an improvement in the latter seems to be favoring a better institutional CDM capacity. 
However, none of the correlations is very strong.89 
4.3. Classification of host countries by cluster analysis 
As the data used in this analysis is measured on different scales, it is standardized using 
z-scores. In the first step of the analysis, I use the Single-linkage algorithm90 to identify 
outliers. China, India and Brazil – countries with an exceptionally high mitigation 
potential and relatively good CDM capacity as well as investment climate - are 
identified as such and are excluded from the data set. In a second step, the Ward-
                                                 
82 Michaelowa (2003) deals with the tasks of host countries in the CDM project cycle, and highlights the 
importance of effective host country institutions for reaping benefits from the CDM market.  Willems 
(2004) deals with the role of the institutional capacity in selecting climate actions in general.  
83 As of 5 October  2004 (www.unfccc.int)  
84 Defined as DNA operating by 4 November 2004.  
85 As of November 2004.  
86 Countries for which none of these criteria apply, will therefore have a minimum value of zero, the ones 
for which all of them apply a maximum value of 4.  
87 For details on the Governance Indicators see Kaufmann et al. (1999a), Kaufmann et al. (1999b), 
Kaufmann et al. (2003) as well as the website at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/index.html. Kearney (2004) conducted a survey 
on the most critical risks to firm operation. Government regulation/legal decisions, country financial risk 
as well political and social disturbances are below the most important risks mentioned by more than 60% 
of total respondents.   
88 The range of the indicator is from -7.5 to 7.5, with higher values indicating a better investment climate.  
89Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.29 and 0.31, respectively. 
90 The Single-linkage algorithm is the simplest of all algorithms and is able to identify outlier well by 
joining them in the last clustering step(s).  
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where xkjg  is the value of the variable j for object k in group g, and x jg is the average of 
the values of variable j in group g. The Ward method joins those groups or elements that 
result in the smallest increase of Vg.  
Table 4-2: Cluster membership of host countries 
Cluster Ward  k-means 
Cluster 1 
Albania, Suriname, Central African Rep., Ivory Coast,  
Mozambique, Gabon, Macedonia, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Bosnia and Herzeg., Chad, Guinea-Bissau, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Benin, Lesotho, Seychelles, 
Dominican Rep., Ghana, Gambia, Guyana, Malawi, 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Senegal, 
Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Syrian Arab Rep., Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Guinea, Papua New Guinea, Togo, Rwanda  
Albania, Suriname, Central African Rep., Ivory 
Coast,  Mozambique, Gabon, Macedonia, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Bosnia and Herzeg., Chad, , Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Benin, Lesotho, Seychelles, Dominican Rep., 
Ghana, Gambia, Guyana, Malawi, Lebanon, 
Mauritania, Zambia, Burkina Faso, Senegal, 
Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Syrian Arab Rep., Tanzania, 
Cameroon, Guinea, Papua New Guinea, Togo, 
Rwanda 
Cluster 2 
Bahamas, Botswana, Qatar, Tunisia, Bahrain, Cape 
Verde, Kuwait, Brunei Darussalam, Oman, United Arab 
Emirates  
Bahamas, Botswana, Qatar, Tunisia, Bahrain, Cape 
Verde, Kuwait, Brunei Darussalam, Oman, United 
Arab Emirates  
Cluster 3 
Algeria, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Congo, Sierra Leone, 
Haiti, Libyan Arab Yam., Tajikistan, Dem. Rep. Congo 
(Zaire), Iraq, Liberia  
Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Sudan, Turkmenistan, 
Congo, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Libyan Arab Yam., 
Tajikistan, Dem. Rep. Congo (Zaire), Iraq, Liberia 
Cluster 4 
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Mongolia, Maldives, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, Costa Rica, Mauritius, 
Uruguay, El Salvador, Jordan, Panama  
Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Mongolia, Maldives, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Chile, Costa Rica, Mauritius, 
Uruguay, El Salvador, Jordan, Panama, Malaysia, 
Bolivia, Morocco  
Cluster 5 
Armenia, Moldova, Guatemala, Madagascar, Jamaica, 
Azerbaijan, Cuba, Laos, Niger, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Yemen, Zimbabwe, 
Bangladesh, Israel, Philippines, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, 
Colombia, Egypt, Bolivia, Vietnam, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Mali, Morocco, Peru  
Armenia, Moldova, Guatemala, Madagascar, 
Jamaica, Azerbaijan, Cuba, Laos, Niger, Paraguay, 
Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Georgia, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, Israel, Philippines, 
Colombia, Egypt, Vietnam, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Mali, Peru 
Cluster 6 Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa  Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa
Cluster 7 North Korea, Venezuela, Nigeria, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia 
Kazakhstan, North Korea, Venezuela, Nigeria, 
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia 
Host countries which were moved to other clusters by the k-means method are underlined. 
 
Ward is chosen, because it is considered to result in a very good cluster structure if the 
expected clusters are relatively equivalent in size and outliers are excluded from the data 
(Backhaus et al. 2003).  
                                                 
91 The Ward-algorithm is sometimes also labelled „Increase in sum of squares“, “Within-group sum of 
squares” or “Error sum of squares”. It requires a proximity matrix of squared euclidian distances.  
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By applying a bootstrapping method, in a third step it will be checked which tree 
partitions are significantly different from random.92 The 7 and 8 cluster solution are the 
only ones deviating significantly from randomness. The 7 cluster solution of the Ward 
method 93  is used as the starting partition for a cluster analysis using the k-means 
method.94 Contrary to hierarchical clustering methods as Ward, k-means belongs to the 
partitioning cluster methods which sort the cases in a series of iterations until converging 
to a stable partition of k clusters. The comparison of cases in the k-means method is 
based on the squared euclidian distance of the case to the cluster centers. If a case is 
found to be nearer to a cluster it is not part of, it will be moved to this cluster until all the 
cases are in their nearest cluster. As k-means is able to identify a very good cluster 
structure if a good starting partition and the cluster number are known, it can be used 
to ’calibrate’ the results of the Ward method. 
Table 4-2 summarizes the cluster memberships of host countries for the Ward and the k-
means method. Host countries which were moved to another clusters by the k-means 
method are underlined.   
The last step of the cluster analysis is the most challenging one, namely the 
interpretation of the clusters found. In the following, I will only look at the results 
obtained by the k-means method. Analyzing cluster centers, shown in Table 4-3, gives a 
first impression of the main characteristics of each group.   
Table 4-3: Cluster means (k-means) and exemplars 





Cluster 1 -0,650 -0,452 -0,128 Senegal 
Cluster 2 -0,856 -0,319 1,494 Bahrain 
Cluster 3 -0,982 -0,216 -1,749 Libyan Arab.Yam. 
Cluster 4 1,096 -0,314 1,202 Panama 
Cluster 5 0,823 -0,159 -0,203 Cuba 
Cluster 6 1,654 3,169 0,421 South Africa 
Cluster 7 -0,564 1,789 -0,533 Venezuela 
 
As the data was standardized for the cluster analysis, the mean over all countries is zero. 
Therefore, negative values show that a variable in the respective cluster has a significant 
lower mean than in the total population and vice versa. Now, each cluster can be broadly 
described in a qualitative manner, as done in Table 4-4, with the first term indicating a 
                                                 
92 This is a standard procedure included in CLUSTAN. For details see Wishart (2004). 
93 The 7 cluster solution is selected because it is characterized by a clear increase in the fusion coefficient 
which can be illustrated by an “elbow” in the inverse scree plot.  
94 For more details, see Bacher (2002), Mucha (1992), Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) 
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group´s characteristic as compared to the mean over the whole data set (based on Table 
4-3), and the term in brackets expressing the absolute range given in each cluster. The 
ranges included in Table 4-4 show that there can be a considerable variance in each 
cluster which is important regarding the homogeneity of the clusters obtained. For the 
interpretation of the clusters, not only the mean but also the variance will have to be 
taken into account.  
Table 4-4: Cluster characteristics 













Range in cluster 
Cluster 1 Low No - low Low Very low - low Bad Very bad - bad 
Cluster 2 Low No - low Low Very low - low Very good Good - very good 
Cluster 3 Low No - low Low Very low - low Extremely bad Extremely bad 
Cluster 4 High Medium - very high Low Very low - high Very good Good - very good 
Cluster 5 High Medium - very high Low Very low - high Bad Very bad - medium 
Cluster 6 Very high High - very high Extremely high 
Very high– 
extremely high Good Very bad – good 
Cluster 7 Low No – medium Very high High – extremely high Bad Very bad - good 
 
In order to test the homogeneity of the clusters, F-values are calculated for each variable 




GJVF =  
with V(J,G) representing the variance of variable J in group g, and V(J) the variance of 
variable J over all cases. Values smaller than 1 indicate that the cluster can be considered 
to be homogenous (Backhaus et al. 2003). Table 4-5, which includes the respective F-
values, shows that only in cluster 6 there is a doubt about cluster homogeneity regarding 







Table 4-5: F-values for each cluster and variable 
 
In the following, I will analyze and interpret each cluster separately with the aim to 
classify countries regarding their attractiveness for future CDM non-sink investment.   
Cluster 1 is characterized by rather low institutional CDM capacity, low mitigation 
potential and a relatively bad investment climate. Consequently, it is to be expected that 
the countries in cluster 1 will not be able to attract any significant CDM (non-sink)95 
investment flows. Therefore, this group can be labelled as very unattractive for (non-sink) 
CDM. The majority of the countries belonging to this group are located in Africa (e.g. 
Mauritania, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania). Some Eastern European countries 
(e.g. Albania, Macedonia), as well as Syria, Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Kyrgyzstan 
are part of this group as well.  
Cluster 2 includes those countries which are characterized by low institutional CDM 
capacity and mitigation potential, but which – contrary to cluster 1 – have a very good 
investment climate. Of the 10 countries in this group, half belongs to the Arabian oil 
exporting countries (e.g. Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates), while the 
others are spread over the whole globe (Bahamas, Tunisia, Botswana, Cape Verde, 
Brunei). In spite of their good investment climate, these countries can be considered not 
very promising CDM host countries, since no climate project related conditions are 
given. As OPEC is not supporting the international climate regime in general, the OPEC 
member states96  will probably not play a significant role in the CDM at all. This, 
however, may change if OPEC countries realize that significant revenues can be 
generated through CDM projects; a first indication is the rapid ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol by a number of OPEC countries after Russian ratification ensured its entry into 
                                                 
95 Countries with bad investment climate and a low institutional CDM capacity are likely to attract as little 
investment in LULUCF as in non-sink projects, since these two criteria will count for the investment in 
LULUCF projects as well. 
96 United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar 
 CDM capacity Mitigation potential Investment climate 
Cluster 1 0.16456583 0.0317284 0.17425392 
Cluster 2 0.18697479 0.10517629 0.13606474 
Cluster 3 0.14355742 0.17311233 0.42185129 
Cluster 4 0.34663866 0.17472665 0.24127466 
Cluster 5 0.22969188 0.23779605 0.17298938 
Cluster 6 0.21008403 1.21960878 0.41401113 
Cluster 7 0.55042017 0.87168136 0.47824987 
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force. From the above, it can be concluded that cluster 2 will as well join the coalition of 
host countries which are very unattractive for (non-sink) CDM investments, but that 
some of these countries may move into Cluster 4 in the near future.   
The 12 countries forming Cluster 3 are characterized by a low institutional CDM 
capacity, low mitigation potential, and an extremely bad investment climate. This group 
comprises countries of Northern, Western and Central Africa (e.g. Algeria, Liberia, 
Congo, Sudan) as well as countries like Haiti, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. There are 
few chances that any of the countries in this group will play a significant role in the 
CDM market, although, some of the countries would offer some mitigation potential (e.g. 
Algeria, Iraq). Therefore, countries in cluster 3 can be considered to belong to the very 
unattractive (non-sink) CDM host countries as well.  
Cluster 4 includes countries with a medium to very high CDM capacity, and a (very) 
good general investment climate. However, the majority of the countries have a rather 
small mitigation potential, although the cluster includes as well some countries which 
are characterized by higher greenhouse gas emissions (Chile, Malaysia and Morocco). 
The small mitigation potential of most of the countries in this cluster can be explained 
by the fact that most of them are very small (e.g. Belize, Antigua and Barbuda, Uruguay, 
Panama, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Jordan, Mauritius, Maldives). In general, 
host countries in cluster 4 can be rated as attractive for CDM (non-sink) investors. As 
front-runner, they are likely to attract a considerable share of the early CDM investment, 
as it has been the case for Costa Rica in the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) phase. 
Due to their size, however, they will not be able to provide a big portion of CDM credits 
in the world-wide market in the long run.  
Cluster 5 is very similar to cluster 4 regarding institutional CDM capacity and mitigation 
potential, with the difference that most of the host countries in this group offer a worse 
investment climate than countries in cluster 4. Egypt is an exception and cannot be 
clearly distinguished from cluster 4. Members of this group are located in Latin America 
(e.g. Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Paraguay), in Africa (e.g. Mali, 
Niger, Uganda), and South East Asia (Laos, Philippines, Vietnam). Furthermore, 
countries like Yemen, Jamaica, Israel, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are part of 
cluster 5 as well. Only a limited attractiveness for non-sink CDM projects can be 
assigned to this group, although some individual countries might offer a greater potential 
than others. Vietnam and Egypt, for example, appear to be the most promising CDM 
(non-sinks) countries in this group.  
  75
The relatively small cluster 6 comprises the 5 countries Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, 
South Africa, and Thailand. Based on the cluster means, these countries are ’CDM-stars’, 
with extremely high CDM capacity, exceptionally high mitigation potential and a good 
investment climate. When looking at the data for each country, the doubt about the 
homogeneity of the cluster regarding the mitigation potential can be ruled out. The 
exceptionally high values for Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa can explain the 
problematic F-value. Therefore, the values allow a consistent interpretation of the cluster 
regarding the mitigation potential. Nevertheless, regarding the investment climate, 
Indonesia is clearly identified as a negative outlier in the group. In summary, the 
countries in this group can be described as very promising CDM (non-sink) countries, 
keeping in mind, though, that Indonesia’s attractiveness might be hampered to some 
extent by its relatively bad investment climate.  
The common feature of host countries in cluster 7 is mainly their extremely high 
mitigation potential, while values for the institutional CDM capacity and the investment 
climate vary considerably. Although investors might find a good potential for CDM 
(non-sink) projects in these countries, they will probably be deterred either by a very bad 
investment climate or a very low CDM capacity. Due to the latter, host countries in 
cluster 7 are considered unattractive for CDM (non-sink) projects.  
Last but not least, the three countries (China, India, and Brazil) which had been excluded 
from the data set as outliers are mentioned as well. These three countries are 
characterized by an exceptionally high mitigation potential, a good institutional CDM 
capacity and a good investment climate, and are known to be the most promising CDM 
(non-sink) host countries. 
Resulting from the above, four main groups of host countries for CDM non-sink projects 
can be identified: countries which are very unattractive, countries which are attractive to 
a limited extent, attractive countries, as well as very attractive countries. The 
attractiveness of CDM host countries as represented by the respective clusters is 
summarized in Table 4-6.  
Table 4-6: Clusters regarding their attractiveness as CDM (non-sink) host countries 
 Very 
unattractive 
Attractive to a 
limited extent Attractive Very attractive 
Clusters 
 
Cluster 1  




Cluster 5 Cluster 4 Cluster 6, China, India, Brazil 
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In the interpretation of clusters, I already mentioned the case of Egypt which would fit as 
well to cluster 4, but has been included in cluster 5 by the cluster analysis. In real world 
data, there always exist cases which cannot be clearly attributed to one group. It is, 
therefore, an essential part of the interpretation of the cluster analysis to point out which 
of the elements are not clearly attributable to one cluster only.  
Table 4-7 shows the cases which are very similar to another cluster97 and denotes if this 
‘instability’ has consequences for the above host country attractiveness classification (as 
illustrated in Table 4-6). 19 cases could be identified as being very close to the mean of 
another cluster. 
Table 4-7: Countries not clearly attributable to one cluster and effect on their classification 








Benin 1 2 No 
Bolivia 4 5 Yes 
Bosnia and Herzeg. 1 3 No 
Cape Verde 2 1 No 
Chad 1 3 No 
Egypt 5 4 Yes 
Guinea-Bissau 3 1 No 
Israel 5 4 Yes 
Jamaica 5 4 Yes 
Kazakhstan 7 1 No 
Kenya 1 3 No 
Lesotho 1 2 No 
Morocco 4 5 Yes 
Philippines 5 4 Yes 
Rwanda 1 3 No 
Seychelles 1 2 No 
Turkmenistan 3 1 No 
Uzbekistan 7 5 Yes 
Vietnam 5 4 Yes 
  
The countries Benin, Lesotho and Seychelles, and Cape Verde appear to lie somewhere 
between cluster 1 and cluster 2. As both clusters include very unattractive CDM host 
countries, this instability does, however, not change our host country classification. The 
latter applies as well to the border cases between cluster 1 and 3 (Bosnia and 
                                                 




Herzegovina, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Rwanda, and Turkmenistan) and cluster 7 
and 1 (Kazakhstan). Nevertheless, in some of the cases host country attractiveness might 
be estimated wrongly if only relying on the cluster membership as given by the k-means 
method. As already noted above, ranges in cluster 4 and 5 are relatively big, which 
hinders the interpretation of the CDM attractiveness of host countries in these clusters. 
The 7 countries that could belong as much to cluster 4 as to cluster 5 are either the less 
attractive cases of cluster 4 (Bolivia, Morocco) or the rather promising cases of cluster 5 
(Egypt, Israel, Jamaica, Philippines, Vietnam). Uzbekistan, although being a member of 
the very unattractive group 7, seems to stick out from this group due to its tendency to 
belong to the countries which are attractive to a limited extent.  
Figure 4-1 illustrates the classification of host countries by mapping countries according 
to their attractiveness for CDM non-sink investment. Thus, it provides a first picture of a 
likely geographical distribution of future CDM (non-sink) investment flows. The darker 
the color, the more attractive a country can be considered for non-sink CDM investment. 
The unstable cases, whose classification is affected by their instability, are presented 
separately (striped grey). 98 
The fact that relatively big countries belong to the category of the very attractive non-
sink CDM host countries can be explained by the use of absolute greenhouse gas 
emissions as an indicator for mitigation potential. However, it is to be expected that a 
range of smaller countries (e.g. Costa Rica, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago) will be quite 
attractive for CDM non-sink investments as well. As mentioned above, they will 
probably be able to reap a significant benefit from the CDM especially in the early phase 
of the market.  
Furthermore, it has to be noted, that all the very attractive host countries, with the 
exception of South Africa, are located either in Latin America or Asia (mainly Central, 
East, South and South East Asia). Most of the host countries in Western Asia, and 
especially in Africa, do not seem to be very promising CDM candidates.   
Assuming that future CDM (non-sink) investment flows will be directed mostly towards 
the host countries which have been classified as attractive and very attractive, it is likely 
that a relatively small proportion of all potential host countries will receive most of the 
CDM investment in the market. Furthermore, it can be expected that the geographical 
distribution of CDM flows will be concentrated in certain regions or even countries.  
 
                                                 




Figure 4-1: Map of the resulting host country classification 
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Moreover, the results suggest that the simplistic assumption of CDM following the same 
paths as traditional FDI flows, is a relatively good approximation - at least for those 
countries with the highest FDI attractiveness. From the countries included in the present 
analysis, China, India, Malaysia, Brazil, Thailand, Mexico and Indonesia are the 
developing countries with the highest FDI confidence index in 2004 (Kearney 2004). 
With the exception of Malaysia, all of these countries are as well classified as the most 
attractive CDM host countries. 
4.4. Current CDM project status 
Being aware that the current distribution of CDM investment cannot be considered 
representative of the one in a mature market, it is still worth having a look at the current 
status of CDM projects with the CDM Executive Board. Figure 4-2 shows the expected 
amount of CERs generated from CDM projects by 2012 available for validation 
comments99 on the UNFCCC CDM website by 10 February 2005. Assuming that the 
amount of CERs is positively correlated to the amount of investment in the respective 
project, Figure 4-2 can give an indication to which extent early CDM (non-sink) 
investment are compatible with my classification of host countries.   
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Figure 4-2: Expected amount of CERs generated from CDM projects by 2012 available for 
validation comments on the UNFCCC CDM website (10 Feb. 2005) 
 
The countries with the biggest amount of CERs from non-sink CDM projects in the first 
commitment period are Brazil, India, South Korea and Argentina. While South Korea - a 
                                                 
99 Includes submitted projects, those under review as well as registered ones.  
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potentially very important host country - was not included in the present analysis, the 
other three have all been classified as very attractive host countries. China, Mexico, 
South Africa, Thailand and Indonesia are lagging behind as compared to their ‘CDM 
host country attractiveness’. However, only the fact that they belong to the first 22 
countries with CDM projects at the current stage, is an indication that their attractiveness 
for CDM non-sink projects is considerable. 
Three of the smaller countries classified as ‘attractive’ (Chile, Costa Rica, Malaysia), as 
well as four of the ‘somehow attractive countries’ (Bolivia, Morocco, Philippines, 
Vietnam) are also participating in the first phase of CDM project proposals. The 
remaining countries Armenia, Bhutan, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Moldova are 
all classified as countries ‘attractive to a limited extent’, with the exception of Bhutan 
which was not included in the present analysis. This very first CDM project data shows 
quite some correspondence with the cluster analysis results. It has to be kept in mind, 
though, that we are in a very early phase of the CDM market. The few projects 
submitted so far can just give an indication, but cannot necessarily be considered 
representative of what a future distribution of CDM projects might look like.  
4.5. Policy implications  
The expectation that it might only be relatively few host countries receiving most of the 
CDM (non-sink) investment flows is not compatible with the above mentioned claim for 
an equitable geographical distribution of CDM project activities in the Marrakech 
Accords.100  
Rules and modalities of the Kyoto Protocol like the exemption of CDM projects in least 
developed countries (LDCs) from the adaptation levy as well as the rules for small scale 
CDM projects aim at rendering CDM projects in less attractive host countries more 
attractive. However, it cannot be expected that they will considerably change the 
distribution of CDM investment flows. Measures like the improvement of the general 
investment climate are more long-term measures and more a development than a climate 
policy issue.   
Consequently, of the three variables included in the cluster analysis only the 
improvement of the CDM institutions and capacity by capacity building will be an 
appropriate measure available to climate policy for promoting a more equal distribution 
                                                 
100 I am neglecting here, that my results are only valid for non-sink projects. Nevertheless, the overall 
distribution of CDM projects is unlikely to be distributed in a more equal manner than the results suggest 
for non-sink CDM projects.   
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of CDM activities.101 It has to be questioned, though, whether CDM capacity building 
makes sense in all cases. For host countries with a considerable mitigation potential and 
an acceptable investment climate, CDM capacity building will be promising in order to 
make these countries more attractive for private CDM investment. Countries whose 
mitigation potential is very small will, however, not necessarily turn into attractive host 
countries if they build up a good institutional CDM capacity.102   
When focusing only on the general investment climate, an increase in the CER price103 
appears to be another appropriate ‘tool’ to achieve a more equitable distribution, since it 
will be able to compensate the higher risk of countries with rather bad investment 
climate, thus increasing investment into less attractive countries. However, this 
argument might not be as straightforward as it seems at first sight. With higher prices 
investors might as well prefer more costly options in already experienced and less risky 
host countries which could lead to a further geographical concentration of CDM 
investment.  
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that it is rather against the general principle 
of a market-based tool like the CDM to result in an equal geographical distribution of 
projects. Measures taken will probably be able to decrease the concentration of projects 
in certain countries and regions to a small extent, but will not solve the problem entirely. 
Considering that the CDM is a market-based tool, it might be more appropriate to ask for 
an equal distribution of CDM opportunities, rather than CDM project activities.  
4.6. Advantages and limits of the approach chosen 
Finally, I would like to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the approach I have 
chosen for the present analysis. As it was the goal to include as many host countries in 
the analysis as possible, relatively few and rough indicators had to be used. So is for 
example non- CO2 emission data for developing countries subject to relatively great 
uncertainties. Moreover, the indicator for CDM capacity is only capable to a limited 
extent of measuring the quality of institutions. More details on the quality of CDM 
institutions can only be investigated by country case studies which are, however, 
currently available for few countries only.  
Furthermore, relatively little is known on the relative importance of factors influencing 
CDM investment. In the present study, therefore, an equal weight of the three 
                                                 
101 For details on the capacity building activities having taken place so far, see Michaelowa (2004).   
102 There might be even cases, where the costs of such capacity and institution building will by far 
outgrow any future CDM inflows.  
103 For example due to strict targets in a second commitment period.  
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dimensions is assumed. Additionally, further factors, e.g. host country climate project 
experience, might play a role for investors’ decisions in the future as well. However, the 
three selected indicators cover the most important dimensions of host country 
attractiveness. Host country ratings include similar dimensions, but are limited on the 
most promising host countries so far. An advantage of cluster analysis over rankings is 
as well that it uses a known concept for classifying host countries, thus making the 
classification rule explicit. It has to be emphasized, though, that it is not free of 
subjectivity, as the researcher´s choice on the variables to be included and the fusion 
algorithm to be used will influence the results. Therefore, host country ratings and a 
classification approach as the one chosen in the present analysis can be considered 
complementary tools, both with their own strengths and weaknesses. 
4.7. Summary and conclusion 
The present study uses cluster analysis for the classification of 114 potential CDM host 
countries based on their attractiveness for CDM non-sink projects. The three dimensions 
of host country attractiveness considered are the mitigation potential, the institutional 
CDM capacity and the general investment climate. Based on the combination of the 
three latter factors four levels of attractiveness are identified, and countries are classified 
according to their cluster memberships. Those cases which are very close to two clusters 
are classified separately as unstable cases.   
The results suggest that the CDM investment in non-sink projects will be concentrated in 
rather few countries. The CDM (non-sink) stars are China, India, Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia and Thailand.104 They are followed by a number of 
smaller attractive countries like Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Mongolia, Panama, 
and Chile. These smaller countries are likely to reap a significant benefit from the CDM 
especially in the early phases of the market. Costa Rica´s role as a front-runner in the 
AIJ phase can be seen as an analogy to their potential importance in the early CDM 
market. The big countries (e.g. China) will probably take over at later stages if they 
succeed in shaping their institutional CDM structures well. It will be, therefore, vital for 
the smaller attractive countries to build flexible CDM institutions which avoid high 
long-term fixed costs.  
While most of the promising CDM host countries are located in Latin America and Asia, 
the general attractiveness of African host countries is relatively low (with the exception 
of South Africa). It is not expected, that the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM 
                                                 
104 South Korea, not included in this analysis, is very likely to also belong to this group. 
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will improve this inequitable geographical distribution.105 Therefore, policy implications 
of these results are addressed. One measure available to climate policy for the promotion 
of a more equal geographical distribution of CDM project activities - as asked for by the 
Marrakech Accords - is a well coordinated and planned CDM capacity building in host 
countries. In the short run, capacity building might contribute to mitigating the problem, 
without being able to solve it entirely. However, since the CDM is a market-based tool, 
it is more appropriate to ask for an equal distribution of CDM opportunities rather than 





















                                                 





Table 4-8: Host country classification 
Very 
attractive Attractive 
Attractive to a 
limited extent Very unattractive 
Argentina Antigua and Barb. Azerbaijan Algeria, Albania 
Brazil Belize Armenia Bahrain, Botswana 
India Chile Bangladesh Bahamas 
Mexico Costa Rica Sri Lanka Bosnia and Herzegovina 
South Africa El Salvador Colombia Benin, Brunei 
Thailand Jordan Cuba Chad, Congo 
China Mongolia Ecuador Dem. Congo (Zaire) 
Indonesia Mauritius Equatorial Guinea Cameroon 
 Maldives Georgia Central African Republic 
 Malaysia Guatemala Cape Verde 
 Panama Honduras Dominican Republic Ethiopia 
 Trinidad and Tobago Laos Gambia, Gabon, Ghana 
 Uruguay Madagascar Guinea, Guyana 
  Moldova Haiti, Iran 
  Mali Ivory Coast 
  Niger Iraq, Kenya 
  Nicaragua Kyrgyzstan, North Korea 
  Paraguay Kuwait, Kazakhstan 
  Peru Lebanon, Liberia, Lesotho 
  Uganda Libyan Arab.Yam., Malawi 
  Yemen Macedonia, Mauritania 
  Zimbabwe Oman, Mozambique 
 Bolivia* Nigeria, Nepal 
 Egypt* Suriname, Pakistan 
 Israel* Papua New Guinea 
 Jamaica* Guinea-Bissau 
 Morocco* Qatar, Rwanda 
 Philippines* Saudi Arabia, Seychelles 
 Vietnam* Senegal, Sierra Leone 
  Sudan, Syria 
  United Arab Emirates 
  Tajikistan, Togo 
  Sao Tome and Principe 
  Tunisia, Turkmenistan 
  Tanzania, Burkina Faso 
  Venezuela, Zambia 
                         Uzbekistan** 
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5. On the Integration of Carbon Dioxide Capture and 
Storage into the International Climate Regime106 
5.1. Introduction 
The debate on the integration of carbon sequestration options into the climate regime has 
so far mainly focused on LULUCF. However, recently capture of carbon dioxide at large 
point sources and its subsequent storage in reservoirs - carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
- entered the political discussion. As CCS is unique in the sense that it does not avoid the 
formation but the emission of CO2  into the atmosphere, the question arises if CCS is 
more similar to an emission reduction (at the source) or a removal activity (sink 
enhancement). 
Moreover, if CCS is supposed to be implemented into the international climate regime, 
two issues have to be addressed: the possible non-permanence of storage as well as 
potential cross-border cases due to a geographical separation of capture and storage. The 
first part of this chapter discusses their implications for inventory and accounting 
practices. The second part addresses economic aspects of considering non-permanence 
of storage of CO2 in geological reservoirs.   
5.2. Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage 
The term ‘Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage’ refers to the capture of CO2, and its 
subsequent storage in reservoirs. CCS can be separated into three elements:  
1. capture (including compression) 
2. transport 
3. storage 
The most suitable sources for CO2 capture are large point sources107 such as industrial 
facilities or power plants.108 In some industrial processes, CO2 is separated from gas 
flows (hydrogen production, natural gas sweetening) in order to be able to continue 
downstream operations. Most of the separated CO2 is vented into the atmosphere and 
only a small fraction is used in, for example, the food industry.109  
                                                 
106 This chapter is based on Bode and Jung (2005). 
107 Ha-Duong and Keith (2002) and Lackner et al. (no year) have also proposed to capture CO2 directly 
from the air, showing that this might become a feasible option in the future.   
108 OECD/IEA (2004) mentions the fuel extraction and transformation sector as an additional important 
emissions source where capture might be applied.  
109 Storage of CO2 due to utilization in the food and fertilizer industry results in very low retention times, 
though, and is therefore, not an important option for CCS.  
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The bulk potential for CO2 capture, however, can be found in the power sector. Three 
processes are available for the capture of CO2 from such large point sources 
(Thambimuthu et al. 2002, VGB 2004):  
a. Post-combustion capture, in which the CO2 is scrubbed from the flue gas.   
b. Pre-combustion capture, in which the CO2is removed prior to combustion by 
producing a hydrogen-rich fuel gas mixed with CO2. The CO2 is separated from 
the latter by physical absorption, while the hydrogen is used for combustion.   
c. Oxyfuel combustion uses oxygen instead of air for combustion, resulting in a flue 
gas consisting mainly of water vapour and CO2.  
Additional energy use caused by the capture processes is referred to as the energy 
penalty, which can range from 15 – 40 percent of energy output (Haefeli et al. 2004).  
Prior to transportation, compression is generally required, resulting in additional energy 
use that is, however, much smaller than the penalty for capture.  
Transport of CO2 is a mature technology, as the technical requirements are similar to 
transporting other gases. Experience with CO2 transport via pipelines already exists, 
especially in the USA where around 2800 km of pipelines are currently in place (Gale 
and Davison 2004). The alternative is to transport carbon dioxide by ship110, especially if 
transport distances are longer or if the capture and storage site are separated by water 
(Wildenborg and van Meer, 2002).  
After transportation, the CO2 is injected into the storage reservoir, which can be either a 
geological reservoir or the ocean. Presently, only storage in geological reservoirs is 
seriously considered as a climate mitigation option (OECD/IEA 2004), and as such will 
form the focus of this paper. Three main groups of geological reservoirs can be 
identified:  
a. Oil and gas reservoirs (depleted, or in combination with Enhanced Oil Recovery, 
EOR or Enhanced Gas Recovery, EGR)111 
b. Saline aquifers 
c. Unminable coal seams (possibly in combination with Enhanced Coal Bed 
Methane Recovery, ECBM) 
                                                 
110 Trucks and trains are also possible media of transport. 
111 While little experience exists with ECBM, EOR has already been applied for some decades to enhance 
oil production. Depending on the location, EOR is profitable today, especially when oil prices are high. 
Contrary to EOR, Enhanced Gas Recovery (EGR) is not yet technically mature or a commercially viable 




The size of the reservoirs available is a major determinant with regard to the relevance 
of CCS as a mitigation option. Various figures have been published (Grimston et al. 
2001, IEA 2001). However, the most detailed and most recent data are provided by 
Hendriks et al. (2004), and summarized in Table 5-1 below. .  











Total Annex-1 *) 2,6 - 186,2 8,4 – 16,8 91,2 - 382 2,5 - 156,7 0 - 401,7 
Total non Annex-1 *) 6,4 - 547,8 13,6 – 27,2 127,8 - 543 1,5 - 234,3 0 - 1078,3 
Total 9 - 734 22 – 44 219 - 925 4 - 391 0 - 1480 
Offshore 
Total Annex-1 *) 0,6 - 67,2 6,1 – 32,6 38,3 - 412,3 13,6 - 20,5 10,4 - 374,1
Total non Annex-1 *) 2,4 - 240,8 13,9 – 74,4 110,7 - 365,7 6,4 - 11,5 19,6 - 706,9
Total 3 - 308 20 - 107 149 - 778 20 - 32 30 - 1081 
*) Own calculation based on data from: Hendriks et al. (2004, p.28) (for example, Former S.U. may 
include both Annex I and non Annex I countries)  
 
As can be seen from the table, there exists great uncertainty regarding the storage 
capacity. Global potential in geological reservoirs is in the range of about 476 to 5880 Gt 
CO2, with a best estimate of 1660 Gt. The geographical distribution of the possible 
storage capacity differs for different types of reservoirs. Saline aquifers seem to be 
distributed most evenly across the world, but also the distance to large amounts of point 
sources of CO2 is of relevance. The bigger part of the world-wide storage potential 
seems to be located in the non Annex I countries of the UNFCCC.  
When analyzing the costs of CCS as a climate mitigation option, the full chain, from 
capture to storage and monitoring has to be taken into account. The cost of CCS 
therefore, consists of: 
 
CCCS = Ccapture + Ctransportation + Cstorage + Cmonitoring 
 
The largest part of CCS costs consists of capture costs, with values ranging from about 
24 to 52 €/t CO2-avoided (Hendriks et al. 2004, VGB 2004).112 However, the costs for 
CO2 capture per ton avoided vary with the plant characteristics and capture system 
                                                 
112 However, whenever talking about costs in relation to the avoided emissions, the baseline plant used to 
calculate the emission reduction costs is of crucial importance. For detailed discussion of this issue see 
Anderson et al. (2003).  
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applied.113 Significantly lower costs are only achieved in capture of CO2 from ammonia 
and hydrogen production.  
Transportation costs by pipeline vary with the transportation distance, the amount 
transported, the pressure of CO2, landscape characteristics, pipeline diameter, and 
country regulations. Per 100 km pipeline, the cost estimates range from 1-6 €/tCO2, with 
decreasing costs for larger throughputs (Hendriks et al. 2004; Freund and Davison 2002). 
The transport of CO2 by ship vessels will be cheaper over longer transportation distances 
(Freund and Davison 2002). 
Storage costs reported in the literature are mainly based on the technical investment to 
be made, notably the drilling of wells and operation costs. Hendriks et al. (2004) 
estimates costs for storage in aquifers, natural gas and empty oil fields at 1 to 11 €/tCO2, 
varying with the depth and permeability, as well as the type of the storage reservoir. For 
EOR, the cost range is from -10 to 30 €/tCO2, taking into account the revenues resulting 
from the enhanced fossil fuel production.114  
Theoretically, possible combinations of the different capture, transport and storage 
options based on the cost estimates mentioned above, may range from profitable values 
of minus 3 to plus 106 €/t CO2-avoided. The vast majority of options will probably be 
somewhere in the middle of this range. Further cost reductions require additional R&D. 
Learning effects seem to be limited, as the single components are already widely 
developed and deployed, rendering economies of scale less important (OECD/IEA 2004, 
p 78). Information on and experience with monitoring costs seems to be very limited. 
5.3. Permanence of storage  
Apart from the technical and economic potential, the issue of the non-permanence of 
storage is also relevant for the implementation of CCS as a mitigation option.  
The term non-permanence describes the likely releases of CO2 after capture has taken 
place. Figure 5-1 illustrates possible emissions along the whole chain of CCS, which 
will have to be accounted for when integrating CCS into the international climate regime. 
In the following, however, we are focusing on emissions from the reservoir.      
While some experts consider seepage rates in well-selected geological reservoirs very 
low (DTI 2004), it is still difficult to predict these rates from long-term storage of very 
                                                 
113 Costs per ton avoided include the costs of the energy penalty. They are, thus, greater than the costs per 
ton captured. The literature costs is extensive. see for example OECD/IEA (2004), Audus 2000, 
Condorelli et al. (1991), Herzog (1999), David and Herzog (2001), Freund and Davison (2002), Göttlicher 
and Pruschek (1999), Reimer et al. (1999), Rubin and Rao (2002), Simbeck (1999), and Smelser (1991).  
114 Further storage cost estimates can be found in e.g. Gupta et al. (2002), Hendriks et al (2001), Reeves 
and Schoeling (2001), Smith et al. (2001), as well as Wildenborg and Van der Meer (2002).  
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large volumes of CO2 (OECD/IEA, 2004, p. 94 - 97). Storage site integrity depends on 
various factors, like the geological characteristics of the reservoir, the history of human 
usage, and the quality of well and sealing packages (e. g. Jimenez et al., 2003). The 




















Figure 5-1: Possible emissions of the CCS chain 
 
Furthermore, unforeseeable events like earthquakes could lead to the rapid release of 
larger volumes of CO2 from the reservoir. Strict criteria for site selection could be seen 
as one means of guaranteeing the high environmental integrity of geological storage 
(Haefeli et al. 2004). We consider such criteria a necessary, but not a sufficient condition 
for the integration of CCS into the international climate regime. They do not guarantee 
the complete accounting of emissions, which is one of the main principles of every 
greenhouse gas accounting framework (Haefeli et al. 2004). The fact that there is a 
possibility of non-permanence of storage makes it necessary to incorporate liability for 
future releases into the accounting scheme in order to guarantee that the burden relating 
to such potential releases cannot be shifted onto others. 
5.4. Integration of CCS into the climate regime 
5.4.1. CCS: removal or emission reduction 
The special characteristic of CCS that results in the formation of CO2 without its 
emission into the atmosphere, gives rise to the important question of whether CSS is 
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Source: Haefeli et al. 2004, p. 15 
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1. a removal (sink enhancement) or  
2. an emission reduction (at source) activity. 
The answer to this question to a great extent determines how CCS will be accounted for 
in the climate regime. When treating CCS as a removal activity, the captured CO2 would 
have to be considered as emitted - even though not vented - into the atmosphere at the 
source, and would therefore appear as an emission in the national emission inventory. 
Any CO2 stored would be accounted for as a removal of CO2 - similar to the accounting 
of sequestration in the LULUCF area (Haefeli et al. 2004). Regarding the removal 
approach, it should to be noted that the term ‘sink’ is defined by the UNFCCC as “any 
process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a 
precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere” (Article 1.8 UNFCCC). This legal 
definition does not apply to the process of CCS, since this option mainly refers to the 
capture of CO2 from point sources and not from the atmosphere. Therefore, CCS has to 
be considered an emission reduction in the framework of the UNFCCC.115 Thus, a 
change in the emission factor will have to account for the captured CO2. The status of 
the discussion in the framework of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse 
Gas Inventories is that the captured CO2 should be metered and subtracted from the 
source emissions. Emissions from transport and injection should be accounted for by the 
country where they occur by using estimates based on industrial experience. Site 
investigation, models and measurements are supposed to provide the estimates of 
releases from the storage site.116  
5.4.2. CCS Cross-border projects 
The fact that CCS is considered an emission reduction has implications regarding the 
characterisation of  this activity under the flexible mechanisms. An overview is given in 
Table 5-2. All the cases where capture (the emissions reduction) takes place in a non-
Annex I country (case 3, 5 and 6 in Table 5-2) fall under the CDM. In these cases, 
emission reduction credits would be generated.117 Regardless of where the CO2 is stored, 
projects with capture in an Annex I country (case 1, 2 and 4 in Table 5-2) can be 
considered Annex I mitigation, either conducted as domestic mitigation or as a JI 
project.118 Those CCS activities in which CO2 is stored in an Annex I country (cases 1-3) 
                                                 
115 Biomass combustion will have to be dealt with differently.   
116 This information is based on a presentation at the Side Event “2006 IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories, held by Simon Eggleston, 20 May at the SB Meeting in Bonn.  
117 For further detail on this, see the analysis below. 
118 Regarding of JI, a third Annex I country in which CO2 is neither captured nor stored, could be part of 
the project buying the emission reduction units. The country in which the emission reduction takes place is 
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account for the possible non-permanence of storage. Seepage from the reservoir will 
appear in the national emissions inventory of the storing Annex I country. A new 
inventory category would have to be introduced for such purposes. 
Table 5-2: Possible combinations of capture and storage countries and resulting type of mechanism 
under the Kyoto-Protocol 
Ca 
se 







Annex I (same as storing country) 
Annex I (other than storing country) 
non- Annex I country  
 
Annex I country 
 
Annex I mitigation* 









non- Annex I ((same as storing country) 
non- Annex I(other than storing country) 
 
 
non- Annex I country
 
Annex I mitigation* 
CDM 
CDM 
*Annex I mitigation can either be domestic mitigation or JI. 
 
However, as non-Annex I countries do not have emission targets, possible seepages from 
the reservoir located in non-Annex I countries will not be subtracted from the emissions 
budget of whatever country. 119  Thus, the overall emissions budget of the Annex I 
countries might be inflated and environmental integrity of the climate regime 
endangered.  
5.4.3. Dealing with liability for non-permanence in non-
Annex I countries 
In order to account for the non-permanence in the case of storage in non-Annex I 
countries, three different solutions are possible.  
1. Ban on CCS with storage in non-Annex I countries 
2. Consideration of seepages by discounting  
3. Creation of rules that account for actually occurring releases  
The first option of restricting CCS to projects with storage in Annex I countries120 would, 
however, decrease the storage potential significantly. Furthermore, it may conflict with 
                                                                                                                                                
always the capture country, which is likely to financially compensate the storing country for costs 
associated with storage (storage, monitoring, risks of later releases etc.).  
119 Similar problems occur if the country has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol or does not have sufficient 
inventory quality. 
120 Those Annex I countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol and comply with a minimum standard 
of inventory quality. 
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the objective of technology transfer to non-Annex I countries.121 Another option is the 
discounting of emission reductions based on an assumed standard rate of seepage (see 
Haefeli et al. 2004). However, discount factors for seepages would have to be estimated 
ex ante for the whole time frame of storage. 122  At present, credible values for 
discounting are not available.123 Another reason why discounting is problematic is that it 
is difficult to account for unforeseeable events or wilful releases.124 If the discount factor 
acknowledges the possibility of these events or releases it is very conservative and thus 
provides little incentives to invest in CCS. If, on the other hand, the discount factor is 
low and thus provides incentives, it cannot include the possible undesirable releases.  
The third option mentioned above relies on a determination of releases from the 
reservoir by monitoring. Thus, the ability of monitoring technologies to quantify 
possible seepage events is an essential condition for creating such a liability framework. 
In the following section we will analyze in further detail, which rules in the framework 
of the international climate regime might be able to guarantee liability for releases from 
storage reservoirs located in non-Annex I countries. In outlining how liability for these 
releases could be established in the Kyoto Protocol, one has to distinguish between the 
CCS projects falling under Annex I mitigation (case 4) and those falling under the CDM 
(case 5 and 6). In case 4, as mentioned above, the emission reduction due to capture of 
CO2 is accounted for by subtracting the captured CO2 from the total CO2 emissions 
formed at the source. Thus, the capturing Annex I country would have to be liable for 
possible emissions from the storage reservoir if it is exporting CO2 into a non-Annex I 
country. Creating liability for emissions in the non-Annex I country could thus be seen 
simply as an inventory question. 125  Similar inventory issues have been discussed 
regarding the treatment of harvested wood products (HWP). Emissions from the 
                                                 
121 See decision 5/CP.7 of the Marrakech Accords. 
122 For an overview of methods for the estimation of default factors and an outline of accounting rules, see 
Yoshigahara et al. (2004).  
123 DTI (2004) comes to the conclusion that “whilst a conservative approach to discounting could be 
adopted, based on estimates from some type of CO2 seepage scenario modelling, current constraints in the 
understanding of specific CO2 fluxes from potential storage reservoirs presents a barrier to setting credible 
rates” 
For monitoring technologies available, see for example Pearce et al. (2004) 
124 Depending on the rule for liability, there might be incentives for reservoir operators in non-Annex I 
countries to release CO2 after “permanent” CERs have been issued and to subsequently refill the reservoir 
and to receive CERs again for the same reservoir. 
125 See also Haefeli et al. (2004), pp. 21-22 
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reservoir in the non-Annex I country could, for example, be included in the national 
emissions inventory of the capturing Annex I country.126   
In the two CDM cases with storage in a non-Annex I country (case 5 and 6), liability has 
to be dealt with differently.127 The buyer of the CERs resulting from a CSS project 
should remain liable for possible emissions. Therefore, expiring CERs128 similar to those 
issued for CDM forestry projects could be one option for guaranteeing liability for the 
stored CO2 in the framework of the international climate regime.  
The respective mechanisms guaranteeing liability in each of the described cases are 
summarized in Table 5-3.  
 
Table 5-3: Different CCS cases and respective mechanisms to guarantee liability for non-
permanence of storage 
 
Case*) Capture - Storage Mechanism Rule guaranteeing liability 
1 & 2 
 





Possible emissions appear in inventory 








Possible emissions appear in inventory 
 of country capturing CO2 
 
3 non-Annex I – Annex I CDM 
 
CER issued, possible emissions appear 
 in inventory of country storing CO2 
 
5 & 6 
 
non- Annex I – non-Annex 
I 
 
CDM Temporary credits issued (buyer liability) 
*) see Table 5-2 
 
The above analysis shows that the way in which CCS is accounted for in the 
international climate regime is likely to depend largely on where capture and storage 
takes place. This suggests that the elaboration of rules and modalities for integrating 
CCS into the international climate regime is probably a complex task. 
 
                                                 
126 This is similar to the ‘Production approach’ proposed for the consideration of HWPs which includes the 
emissions from the HWP pool in a non-Annex I country in the national inventory of the exporting Annex I 
country. For an overview of the HWP discussion, see UNFCCC (2003d). 
127 Issuance of permanent CERs is unproblematic if CO2 is stored in an Annex I country (case 3). 
128 For forestry projects, two types of expiring credits exist (temporary CERS, tCERs and long-term CERs, 
lCERs). For more information on temporary credits for LULUCF, see Dutschke et al. (2004). 
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5.5. Economic implications of non-permanence of CCS  
With the exception of EOR, CCS does not produce any additional income except for that 
generated by the credits for the CO2 storage. Kallbekken and Torvanger (2004) compare 
the net economic benefit of geological storage at different levels of permit prices. 
However, when comparing costs with the benefits of CCS, the cost term must also 
include the costs of the non-permanence of carbon dioxide storage.129 Therefore, in the 
following economic analysis, we apply the approach of temporary credits in the CDM to 
CCS. 
In case of releases of CO2, temporary credits have to be replaced by the country which 
has used them for compliance. We call the cost incurred to compensate for future 
releases of CO2 replacement costs (RC). The replacement costs are equal to the 
discounted costs incurred for buying (permanent) credits on the market to compensate 
for future CO2 releases.130 Therefore, the benefit of temporary storage in economic terms 
lies in the postponement of the purchase of a permanent permit. Consequently, the value 
of temporary storage (Vtemp) is equal to the value of a permanent emissions reduction 
(Vperm) minus the replacement costs131:  
 
Vtemp = Vperm- RC 
 
With decreasing replacement costs, the value of the temporary credit will increase. Due 
to these additional costs related to the future releases of CO2, any (temporary) CCS 
activity must be cheaper than permanent mitigation options by an amount equivalent to 
the replacement costs. Based on this concept, the value of temporary storage for 
different release and discount rates, expressed in a percentage of the value of a 
permanent emission reduction, is calculated (see Table 5-4). In the calculation, we 
assumed a stable price for (permanent) emission reduction credits.132  While at low 
release and high discount rates, the value of temporary storage is almost equal to the 
value of permanent emissions reductions, high release rates and low discount rates lead 
to substantial decreases in the value of temporary storage. With permanent storage, the 
value of a temporary credit would, of course, be equal to the value of a permanent one.  
                                                 
129 For a detailed analysis on the effectiveness of carbon storage with a focus on non-permanence, see 
Herzog et al. (2003) 
130 See also Ha-Duong and Keith (2003). 
131 The value of temporary storage consists of the price obtained for the chain of temporary credits 
generated during the crediting period. 
132 When assuming e.g  continously increasing prices in the future, the general tendency remains the same.  
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In spite of the fact that the temporary credits approach has only been proposed for cases 
5 and 6, the results represented in Table 5-4 are, from an economic perspective, also 
valid for the other CCS cases.  
Table 5-4: Value of temporary storage in a percentage of the value of (permanent) emission 
reduction, stable carbon price path 
Vtemp    Release rate (%) 
   0 0.01 0.1 1 
1 100 98.8 90.6 48.5 
5 100 99.6 97.7 80.8 
Discount 
Rate (%) 
10 100 99.7 98.7 88.0 
 
As long as liability for future releases is guaranteed, either the capture country (as in 
case 4), or the storing country (as in cases 1, 2 and 3), has to incur the cost related to 
future releases from the reservoir. As release rates are expected to be rather low in most 
cases, it can therefore be concluded that the decrease in the value of temporary storage 
due to non-permanence is almost negligible for CCS in general.  
For those CDM cases for which the temporary credits approach was proposed (cases 5 
and 6), this conclusion is not generally valid. The assumption underlying such a 
calculation is that a CCS CDM project can generate temporary credits over an 
unrestricted period of time. However, the time for receiving CERs under the CDM, the 
so called crediting period, is currently limited. For energy projects, the maximum 
crediting period is 21 years, for forestry, 60 years.133 While permanent CERs do not 
have to be replaced after the end of the crediting period, all temporary credits generated 
by forestry projects expire after the end of the crediting period. The latter is equivalent to 
the assumption that after 60 years, all the sequestered carbon is released into the 
atmosphere, even if it remains sequestered in the biomass thereafter. The special case of 
temporary credits with restricted crediting periods in the CDM will make temporary 
carbon storage less attractive since it reduces the value of temporary storage. The reason 
for such a pattern originates from the fact that crediting periods considerably shorter 
than retention times neglect a great part of the storage taking place beyond the crediting 
period. Therefore, the benefit from postponing the purchase of permanent credits can 
only be realised in part, as illustrated by Figure 5-2. 
 
                                                 
133 The rules and modalities offer a choice between a non-renewable crediting period of (10) 30 and a 
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   Figure 5-2: Effects of a limitation of a crediting period 
 
In the case that also CSS CDM projects using temporary credits (case 5 and 6) should be 
subject to a limited crediting period, the value of temporary storage would be 
significantly smaller than for the other CCS cases. In the case of short crediting periods 
(e.g. 20-60 years), the economic viability of such CDM projects is going to decrease 
significantly as compared to those generating permanent credits.  
5.6. Conclusion 
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) does not avoid the formation, but the 
emission of CO2 to the atmosphere. According to Art. 1.8 of the UNFCCC, CCS has to 
be considered an emission reduction. When integrating CCS into the climate regime, one 
has  to however taken into account that there might be releases of the stored CO2 back to 
the atmosphere and that CO2 might be transported over country borders.  
Based on the fact that CCS is an emission reduction, we conclude that all CCS projects 
with capture in a non-Annex I country fall under the CDM, while the projects capturing 
CO2 in an Annex I country could be considered Annex I mitigation (either domestic 
mitigation or JI), independently of where the CO2 is stored.   
When CO2 is stored in an Annex I country that has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and 
complies with inventory quality standards, possible non-permanence of storage is 
accounted for as emissions from the reservoir. CO2 releases will enter the national 
emission inventory of the Annex I country in which the reservoir is located. As non-
Annex I countries do not have emission targets, possible seepage from the reservoir 
located in non-Annex I countries will, however, not be subtracted from the emission 
budget of whatever country. Thus, it could water down the overall emission target of the 
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climate regime. Therefore, special liability rules will have to be implemented for those 
cases in which CO2 is stored in non-Annex I countries. In the case in which an Annex I 
country is exporting CO2 to a non-Annex I country, a possible solution may be to have 
the Annex I country report emissions from the reservoir and include them in its own 
national emissions inventory. In the case of capture and storage taking place in a non-
Annex I country, liability for the stored CO2 could be created by expiring credits, 
similar to those issued for forestry projects in the CDM.  
If release rates from the storage reservoirs are as small as widely suggested (> 0.01), the 
cost  incurred to compensate future releases can be expected to be negligible. It has to be 
noted however, that the economic viability of CDM projects that generate temporary 
credits and are subject to relatively short crediting periods can decrease significantly as 
compared to those generating permanent credits.  
The present paper focused on two of the most important issues: accounting for releases 
from the reservoir and cross-border cases. Nevertheless, there are further issues which 
must be dealt with before CCS can be accounted for appropriately as a climate 
mitigation option. Accounting might become much more complicated than discussed, if 
different CO2 exporting (capture) countries use the same storage reservoir, and if release 
rates are a function of the quantity stored. Transboundary reservoirs, too, may be 
difficult to deal with due to the territory principle underlying the Kyoto Protocol. Finally 
CO2 stored in non-Annex I countries may become a contentious issue when emission 
targets for these Parties are negotiated  in the future. 
Regarding  the numerous complexities of integrating CCS into the international climate 
regime, it has to be kept in mind that only accurate and complete accounting which 
guarantees the long-term liability for future releases, will allow CCS to become a 




























The present thesis deals with carbon sequestration options in the international climate 
regime, with a focus on carbon sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere as well as 
carbon dioxide capture and storage.  
Chapter 2 comprises a study of the negotiation process on LULUCF in the framework of 
the UNFCCC. This analysis combines qualitative background information with a 
quantitative approach to explain negotiating positions and behavior of Parties in the 
negotiations on LULUCF. A multinomial logit model is used to identify factors 
influencing the LULUCF negotiating position of countries. The results suggest that the 
most important reason for supporting the introduction of LULUCF in the calculation of 
emission targets has been the attitude towards international climate policy in general. 
Another, although less important, factor influencing the negotiation position regarding 
Article 3.3 and 3.4 is the amount by which Parties were able to reduce their already 
agreed emission target due to the introduction of LULUCF. The countries pushing for 
the inclusion of LULUCF under Article 3.3 and 3.4 were, however, not necessarily the 
countries with the most stringent targets. The factors influencing the positions on the 
inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM are more complex and less clear than the ones 
on LULUCF in Annex I inventories. A zero-inflated Poisson model is applied to 
examine which factors had an influence on the participation of countries in the 
submission process on LULUCF. Countries in favor of the inclusion of additional sink 
activities appear to have been more actively involved in the submission process on 
LULUCF, while the exact opposite seems to be the case for supporters of the inclusion 
of forestry projects in the CDM. Moreover, a positive but modest influence of the 
delegation size on the number of submissions can be identified. The results of this 
chapter can contribute to a better understanding of the role of carbon sequestration 
options in the negotiation of emission targets. It has to be emphasized, though, that this 
analysis aims solely at the identification of factors influencing negotiating positions and 
the participation in the submission process, but does not try to explain the outcome of 
the negotiations.   
Chapter 3 examines the market effects of decisions taken in the negotiations dealt with 
in Chapter 2. It focuses on the inclusion of forestry projects in the CDM. Marginal 
carbon sequestration cost curves representing different LULUCF policy scenarios are 
developed and implemented into the partial equilibrium model of the international 
market for emissions offsets CERT. A sensitivity analysis is conducted in order to 
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account for the uncertainties in the data on forestry potentials and costs. The results 
suggest that the reduction in the market price due to the inclusion of forestry projects in 
the CDM will be rather small in all the scenarios if compared to the effect of the 
withdrawal of the US and the hot air in the market. Furthermore, the distributional 
effects of making forestry an eligible CDM activity (in comparison to a purely energy-
based CDM) are investigated and compared to the respective negotiating positions of 
Parties to the UNFCCC. While Annex B countries profit from the introduction of 
forestry in the CDM, non-Annex B countries lose or remain unaffected. A devaluation of 
the hot air held by Russia and the Eastern European countries is the reason for losses 
encountered by these countries due to the introduction of forestry in the CDM. Inside the 
non-Annex I group, income is shifted away from China and the Dynamic Asian 
Economies, while Brazil is the biggest winner of an introduction of forestry in the CDM. 
The distributional pattern is partly in line with country negotiating positions on 
LULUCF in the CDM. Brazil and the European Union, however, have been rejecting the 
integration of LULUCF in the CDM although they could benefit from it economically. 
This adds an additional aspect to the results obtained in Chapter 2, showing that country 
negotiating positions are only partly based on economic rationale, while political factors 
might weight more heavily for certain countries. An analysis based on sequestration cost 
curves as the one in Chapter 3 rests upon the underlying assumption that the amount of 
sequestration taking place is purely determined by the potential and its respective costs. 
However, other factors are likely to play a significant role for CDM investment flows as 
well. This aspect is taken into account in the following chapter. 
In Chapter 4, a host country classification based on the attractiveness of CDM host 
countries is elaborated using cluster analysis. Not only the mitigation potential of a 
CDM host country is considered, but also the investment climate as well as the 
institutional CDM capacity are taken into account in the classification. Due to the lack of 
data on LULUCF potentials for the whole set of countries included in the study, the 
analysis is restricted to non-sink projects only. The resulting classification of host 
countries provides a first picture of what the distribution of CDM flows might look like. 
The results suggest that CDM investment in non-sink projects will be concentrated in 
rather few countries and regions. Of the countries included in the analysis, the CDM 
stars are China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, Indonesia and Thailand. 
Some smaller countries like Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama and Chile are 
promising CDM countries as well. The smaller host countries are likely to reap a 
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significant benefit from the CDM, especially in the early phases of the market. The big 
countries will probably take over at later stages if they succeed in shaping their CDM 
institutions well. The inequitable geographical distribution is unlikely to change 
considerably if forestry options in the CDM are considered as well. Climate policy has 
little means available to promote a more equal distribution of CDM projects, as it is 
asked for by the Marrakech Accords. Since the CDM is a market-based tool, however, it 
seems more appropriate to ask for an equal distribution of CDM opportunities rather 
than CDM project activities.  
While the discussion on LULUCF in the context of the UNFCCC is quite advanced, the 
issue of whether and how to account for carbon dioxide capture and storage has entered 
the political debate only recently. Therefore, Chapter 5 deals with the integration of 
carbon dioxide capture and storage into the international climate regime. As CCS is 
different from LULUCF in the sense that it does not sequester carbon from the 
atmosphere but directly at the emission source, based on the UNFCCC sink definition, it 
will have to be dealt with as an emission reduction activity in the international climate 
regime. Inventory and accounting methods will have to consider that the captured CO2 
might be transported over country borders and be stored in a different country than the 
one where it has been captured. CCS projects with capture in a non-Annex I country fall 
under the CDM, while the projects capturing CO2 in an Annex I country could be 
considered Annex I mitigation.    
When CO2 is stored in an Annex I country, possible CO2 releases from the reservoir will 
enter the national emission inventory of the Annex I country in which the reservoir is 
located. As non-Annex I countries do not have emission targets, possible seepage from 
the reservoir located in non-Annex I countries will, however, not be subtracted from the 
emission budget of whatever country. Therefore, special liability rules will have to be 
implemented for those cases in which CO2 is stored in non-Annex I countries. In the 
case in which an Annex I country is exporting CO2 to a non-Annex I country, a possible 
solution may be to have the Annex I country report emissions from the reservoir and 
include them in its own national emissions inventory. In the case of capture and storage 
taking place in a non-Annex I country, liability for the stored CO2 could be created by 
expiring credits, similar to those issued for forestry projects in the CDM.  
If release rates from the storage reservoirs are as small as widely suggested (> 0.01), the 
cost  incurred to compensate future releases can be expected to be almost negligible. It 
has to be noted however, that the economic viability of CDM projects that generate 
  103
temporary credits and are subject to relatively short crediting periods can decrease 
significantly as compared to those generating permanent credits. This shows that 
implementation issues can determine to a great extent the costs and benefits of CCS and, 
therefore, exert a great influence on the role it might play as a mitigation option in the 
future.  
The present thesis contributes to improving the understanding of carbon sequestration in 
the international climate regime. It goes without saying that it can only address a small 
selection of the issues relevant to carbon sequestration as a climate mitigation option.  
One issue not dealt with explicitly is the argument that carbon sequestration options will 
fulfill a ‘bridging function’. This refers to the possibility to limit the increase in the 
greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere until cheap technological options for 
emission reductions at the source are available. An argument which can be brought up 
against this is that the widespread use of carbon sequestration instead of emission 
avoidance could lead to a delay in the development of such technologies. These are 
essential questions which should be addressed in more detail by future research on 
carbon sequestration. This is especially relevant regarding CCS because its 
attractiveness lies exactly in the possibility to achieve significant emission reductions 
without the need to restructure the world energy system significantly.  
Since carbon sequestration implies the risk of a future release of the stored carbon, a 
detailed set of rules and modalities guaranteeing liability for such releases is essential. 
Throughout this thesis, it became clear that this is one of the reasons why 
implementation of carbon sequestration as a mitigation option in the framework of the 
international climate regime is a rather challenging task.  
The implementation of LULUCF into the climate regime has, however, contributed to 
the slowly growing efforts to create markets for environmental services (internalization 
of positive externalities). Hence, the UNFCCC more than any other convention has its 
share in giving the issue of financing of environmental services (carbon sequestration in 
forests) an international dimension. It has to be mentioned, though, that LULUCF 
activities which are only focused on carbon sequestration might as well be in conflict 
with goals of other international conventions, e.g. the Biodiversity Convention. Since the 
only aim of CCS consists in carbon sequestration, ancillary (environmental) benefits as 
potentially occuring in the area of LULUCF cannot be expected to arise from its use as a 
climate mitigation option. 
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In spite of the growing knowledge on carbon sequestration, its share in the portfolio of 
mitigation options is still quite uncertain. However, the role carbon sequestration will 
play in the future does not only depend on its technical potentials and costs, but also on 
the degree by which rules and modalities elaborated for its integration into an 
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